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A persistent focus on the concept of emergence as a core element of the scientific method allows a
clean separation, insofar as this is possible, of the physical and philosophical aspects of the problem
of outcomes in quantum mechanics. The philosophical part of the problem is to explain why a closed
system has definite experimental outcomes. The physical part is to show mathematically that there
exists a limit in which the contradiction between unitary Schro¨dinger dynamics and a reduction
process leading to distinct outcomes becomes negligible according to an explicitly stated criterion,
and to make this criterion as objective as possible. The physical problem is solved here by redefining
the notion of a quantum state and finding a suitable measure for the change of state upon reduction.
The appropriate definition of the quantum state is not as a ray or density operator in Hilbert space,
but rather as an equivalence class consisting of all density operators in a given subspace, the members
of which all describe the same experimental outcome. For systems containing only subsystems that
are integrated with their environments, these equivalence classes can be represented mathematically
by projection operators, and the resulting formalism is closely related to that used by von Neumann
to study the increase of entropy predicted by the second law of thermodynamics. However, nearly
isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly, as a consequence of their interaction with integrated
subsystems. The reduced states of isolated subsystems are the same conditional states used in the
definition of quantum discord. The key concepts of decoherence theory can all be adapted to fit
this definition of a quantum state, resulting in a unified theory capable of resolving, in principle, all
aspects of the quantum measurement problem. The theory thus obtained is weakly objective but
not strongly objective.
I. INTRODUCTION
The measurement problem has been the central mys-
tery of quantum mechanics for more than 90 years [1–
8]. It comprises three distinct but interrelated issues [9].
The interference problem is to explain why quantum in-
terference effects are difficult to observe, especially on
macroscopic scales. The preferred-basis problem is to de-
fine which particular set of variables is actually observed.
The problem of outcomes, also called the and–or problem
[10–14], is to reconcile our perception of a unique ex-
perimental outcome with the superposition of many out-
comes generated by the Schro¨dinger equation. How is it
physically possible to perceive Schro¨dinger’s cat [15] as
dead or alive, rather than as a superposition of dead and
alive (whatever that might mean)? The ultimate goal
is to reconcile the notorious “reduction” or “collapse” of
the quantum state with the unitary dynamics of a closed
system.
It is well known that this cannot be done in the sense
of a strict logical deduction, because the two processes
are fundamentally contradictory [1, 2, 5, 16, 17]. The
goal is rather to show that reduction emerges from uni-
tary dynamics, in much the same way that temperature
in thermodynamics emerges from statistical mechanics.
That is, we must show that there exists some limit in
which the discrepancy between the two processes van-
ishes. This technique is ubiquitous in the physical sci-
ences [18–28]; from the standard model of quantum field
theory [29] on up, there is no example of an empirically
validated scientific theory that is not widely accepted to
be emergent.
It is now generally acknowledged that, in this sense,
the theory of decoherence [9, 30–33] has solved both the
interference problem and the preferred-basis problem [9].
The problem of outcomes, however, remains unsolved
[9, 30, 34]. This is a problem in physics, not in philoso-
phy or interpretation. Faced with an open contradiction
at the heart of a fundamental physical theory, the job of
the physicist [35] is either to “define the real problem”
by showing that the theoretical conflict has definite ex-
perimental implications, or to prove “that there’s no real
problem” by showing that the contradiction can be re-
solved as a case of emergence. Feeling “nervous” at our
sustained inability to finish this job is the mark of a good
scientist [35], not of a bad philosopher or interpreter.
Here I show that the problem of outcomes can indeed
be resolved as a case of emergence. A crucial element of
the solution is finding a suitable measure for the change
in the quantum state upon reduction. The solution is
not trivial, because it only works if the quantum state
itself is redefined. The quantum state should be defined
neither as a ray in Hilbert space nor as a statistical mix-
ture of such rays (i.e., as a density operator), but as an
equivalence class [36–38] of density operators. The prop-
erties of a closely related equivalence class were studied
long ago by von Neumann [36], but his results have since
been all but forgotten. The central message of this paper
is that a modified version of von Neumann’s definition
allows the last remaining part of the quantum measure-
ment problem to be solved. This modification unifies von
Neumann’s theory with various elements of modern de-
coherence theory, including the concept of a conditional
state used in the definition of quantum discord [39–42].
A brief account of the equivalence-class formulation of
the quantum state is presented elsewhere [43], focusing
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2on the central role played by Bohr’s concept of comple-
mentarity.
It should be stressed that this emergence-based so-
lution does not answer philosophical questions such as
why measurements have outcomes at all, or what it is
that selects a particular outcome [9]. However, as dis-
cussed below, it is doubtful whether pilot-wave [44–46]
or dynamical-reduction [47, 48] theories truly answer
these questions either, because their ontological claims
are based on concepts that seem to be entirely explicable
as emergent.
The paper begins in Sec. II with a discussion of how
the concept of emergence allows us to reconcile the of-
ten contradictory demands of different levels of physical
theory. Section III argues that such contradictions are in-
herent in the scientific method itself. Section IV reviews
the mathematical formalism for the reduction process in
conventional quantum mechanics. Section V reviews the
use of decoherence theory to justify the emergence of non-
interference between conditional probabilities in a quan-
tum history. The significance of various possible metrics
for the emergence of outcomes is studied in Sec. VI.
Section VII shows that the problem of outcomes can be
resolved in the special case of integrated subsystems by
von Neumann’s definition of equivalence classes. Com-
parison between theory and experiment is made possible
by the emergence of statistical frequencies in an ensem-
ble, as described in Sec. VIII. The theory is extended
to include isolated subsystems in Sec. IX. The preferred-
basis problem is addressed in Sec. X using a modified
version of Zurek’s predictability sieve. Section XI dis-
cusses the weakly objective nature of the solutions and
examines various claims of strong objectivity in quan-
tum mechanics. Reasons why the concept of emergence
is applicable to the quantum measurement problem are
further discussed in Sec. XII. Finally, Sec. XIII summa-
rizes the conclusions of the paper.
II. WHAT EMERGENCE MEANS
It is important to clarify at the outset some possible
misconceptions [49] that could arise from popular slo-
gans such as “more is different” [18] and from the idea
that the elementary entities of an emergent level of de-
scription “obey the laws” [18] of the more fundamental
level. These might give the impression that the concept
of emergence is inapplicable to such fundamentally dis-
parate processes as quantum-state reduction and unitary
dynamics. However, this is not so; there is no essential
difference between this case of emergence and that of,
say, temperature in thermodynamics.
Thermodynamics emerges from statistical mechanics
in the so-called thermodynamic limit N → ∞, V → ∞,
N/V = constant, in which N is the number of particles
in a system and V is its volume. Of course, in any real
experiment, N and V are finite, but typically N  1.
Invoking the thermodynamic limit is a signal that one
intends to ignore small terms involving δ = 1/N in cer-
tain parts of the theory, while usually retaining them in
other parts of the theory. The validity of the limit sim-
ply means that if neglecting these terms gives acceptable
results when δ = δ0  1, then the same will be true
for all other cases in which δ < δ0; there is no need to
investigate these cases individually.
Ignoring δ in certain parts of a theory means setting
δ = 0 when actually δ > 0. This changes the logical
structure of the theory, so that many things that were
true in the original theory become false in the modified
theory, and vice versa. The two theories are thus logi-
cally contradictory for all cases of practical relevance (i.e.,
when δ > 0). Within the modified logical framework,
there may be some new concepts that are immensely
powerful in elucidating the structure of the new theory
(i.e., they vastly increase its algorithmic compressibility).
These are referred to as emergent concepts. Temperature
and entropy are examples of such concepts in thermody-
namics.
These quantities can already be defined in statistical
mechanics by means of the canonical or microcanonical
probability distribution. Other thermodynamic variables
are limited to a few statistical moments of the proba-
bility distribution, such as mean values and correlation
functions, but this restriction is not the primary issue
of concern. The problem is that temperature and en-
tropy are defined operationally in thermodynamics via
the properties of interacting subsystems. For example,
temperature is defined operationally as what is measured
by a thermometer, which is an open system that func-
tions by interacting with its local environment for a long
time (relative to the relaxation time) until they come to
equilibrium. Of course, equilibrium is itself an emergent
concept that never holds exactly in any real experiment.
In order to apply the statistical-mechanical definitions
of temperature and entropy to such a situation, we must
introduce subsystems [50, 51] and separate the energy
of a closed system into several parts. The external en-
ergy includes the bulk kinetic energy of each subsystem
and the macroscopic energy of interaction between the
subsystems, such as the gravitational energy of interac-
tion between small volume elements in a planet or star.
The internal energy of each subsystem depends on its
internal microscopic properties, the details of which are
regarded as irrelevant in thermodynamics. The tempera-
ture and entropy of each subsystem are defined in terms
of its internal energy. Both external and internal energy
are thermodynamic variables.
What remains is the microscopic energy of interaction
between subsystems. This is not a thermodynamic vari-
able. It is ignored in thermodynamics even though it
is nonzero in statistical mechanics. The justification for
this is that all long-range interactions are assumed to
have been included in the macroscopic energy of interac-
tion. Thus, the microscopic energy of interaction may be
regarded as a short-range surface effect, which becomes
negligible in comparison to the internal energy of the
3subsystems (a volume effect) for regularly shaped subsys-
tems in the thermodynamic limit. One could conceivably
also argue that, on average, this energy should also van-
ish (or at least reach a minimum) in the limit of thermal
equilibrium, independent of the thermodynamic limit. In
either case, ignoring this energy makes it possible to for-
mulate conservation of energy in terms of thermodynamic
variables alone.
But this shows that the law of conservation of energy
in thermodynamics contradicts the law of conservation
of energy in statistical mechanics. These two laws can be
reconciled only if we agree to ignore the microscopic en-
ergy of interaction. Of course, this approximation cannot
be invoked outside this narrow context. The microscopic
energy of interaction is essential, for instance, if we wish
to describe the dynamics of nonequilibrium systems—it
gives rise to the existence of heat transfers and the attain-
ment of thermal equilibrium, both of which are essential
to the empirical definitions of entropy and temperature.
The link thus established between statistical mechanics
and thermodynamics is not trivial, due to the long range
of the Coulomb interaction. One must define subsystems
carefully so that all Coulomb terms can be clearly sep-
arated [52] into (1) long-range macroscopic effects that
appear only in the external energy and (2) screened short-
range effective interactions that appear in both the inter-
nal energy and the microscopic energy of interaction. The
emergence of temperature in thermodynamics therefore
requires, in addition to the thermodynamic limit, another
level of emergence in which well-defined subsystems with
these properties emerge from a collection of charged par-
ticles.
The notion of a state in thermodynamics is thus fun-
damentally different from that in statistical mechanics,
because the thermodynamic state has the presumed ex-
istence of subsystems with negligible microscopic energy
of interaction built into its very foundations [50, 51]—
otherwise it is experimentally vacuous. This mandatory
change in the definition of state is a key indicator that
the thermodynamic temperature and entropy are truly
emergent quantities. The essence of this constraint was
already well understood by Gibbs in 1902 [53].
Whether subsystems with the requisite properties can
be defined also depends strongly on which phases of mat-
ter are present in the system. Different phases must be
described by different thermodynamic variables, so the
choice of thermodynamic variables is also connected with
the definition of subsystems.
Hence, this example shows clearly that thermodynam-
ics does not “obey the laws” of statistical mechanics in
any case of practical relevance (i.e., for finite N). The
two theories may give very similar predictions if the con-
ditions are right, but they remain logically contradictory.
The contradiction can be tolerated only if we choose to
ignore certain small but nonzero quantities. It is this
choice that makes the difference, not the mere presence
of “more.”
The conflict between unitary dynamics and quantum-
state reduction is no greater than that between the two
laws of energy conservation in statistical mechanics and
thermodynamics. In both cases the emergent theory con-
tradicts basic properties of the fundamental theory. The
conflict is resolved by identifying a suitable limit in which
the contradiction can be ignored.
III. SCIENCE IS CONTRADICTORY
Secret, secret, close the doors!
— R. P. Feynman [35]
Many physicists are uneasy with the idea of drawing
an analogy between thermodynamics and quantum me-
chanics. Bell, for example, has eloquently expressed the
opinion [4] that quantum mechanics should be formu-
lated “precisely,” without reference to approximations or
the concept of emergence. Bell is more than happy to
use approximations in practical applications, but he feels
they should play no role in the basic formulation of any
theory that has aspirations to be fundamental.
There is, however, a case to be made for the claim
that the most important characteristic of a fundamen-
tal theory is not “precision” but universality. A fun-
damental scientific theory should permit the existence,
at least in principle, of all that we see around us, in-
cluding scientists. In particular, it should allow the evo-
lution of “information gathering and utilizing systems”
[54] or protoscientists with the ability to profit from even
the barest rudiments of the scientific method. But this
points away from “precision” and toward the inclusion
of emergence at the most fundamental level, because the
scientific method is inherently self-contradictory.
The first requirement of science is that it should refer
only to things that are objective, in the sense that they do
not depend on the perspective of any observer. In quan-
tum mechanics, this level is described by the unbroken
symmetry of the quantum state vector, evolving unitarily
in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation.
The second requirement of science is that it should
be capable of describing differences. The most primitive
scientific statement is the bare observation that “this is
different from that.” But this requires some way of as-
signing meaning to this and that. In quantum mechanics,
this is done by defining subsystems. However, there is no
objective way to do this; subsystems are inherently con-
textual entities that always refer, at least implicitly, to
the perspective of an observer.
The third requirement of science is that it should be
capable of describing regularities. The laws of science
refer only to what is repeatable. But no two things in
this world are ever exactly the same, if only because they
occur at different places or different times, and in dif-
ferent environments. A protoscientist will not get very
far if it is only capable of being perpetually astounded
by the newness of it all. Regularities come into existence
only after the protoscientist declares what is relevant and
4what is irrelevant. In quantum mechanics, this is done
in part by defining collective variables (to be discussed
further below), and in part by discarding irrelevant por-
tions of the quantum state during the reduction process.
Regularities, the raw material of science, are therefore
unavoidably subjective.
Hence, the most basic principles of the scientific
method demand that science be simultaneously objective
and subjective. The only way to combine these conflict-
ing requirements in a single theory is to veil the contra-
dictions using the technique of emergence. In this way
the theory can be made weakly objective, in a sense to
be defined below.
This is reminiscent of the story of the emperor’s new
clothes [55]. The emperor (science) is forbidden to flaunt
a naked contradiction in public. Clothing the emperor
in metaphysics will not do, for there are many shrewd
children in the audience; only mathematical garments
suffice. The fig leaf of emergence may not be much, but
it is all that we have and all that we need.
Various degrees of objectivity and subjectivity were
defined by d’Espagnat [5, 14]; the definitions adopted
here are somewhat modified [56]. An overtly subjective
theory is one that depends explicitly on the capabilities
of individual protoscientists. An intersubjective theory
depends on these capabilities, but all protoscientists are
assumed to be roughly the same, which makes it possible
for them to reach mutual understanding and agreement.
A weakly objective theory is one that relies upon the con-
cept of emergence, but the quantities thereby ignored are
far below the resolution limits of the protoscientists, so
the theory does not depend explicitly on the capabilities
of protoscientists. Thermodynamics is weakly objective
in this sense, because the coarse graining that is used to
establish the second law of thermodynamics need not be
tailored explicitly for the limitations of human observers.
Weak objectivity strengthens intersubjective agreement
by allowing protoscientists to avoid (for the most part)
squabbles over solipsism. But an element of subjectivity
always remains in a weakly objective theory.
Zeh has described the ideal limit in which the quanti-
ties declared to be irrelevant do not refer directly to the
knowledge of any actual observer as a process of “objec-
tivization” of a subjective theory [57]. Zurek has stressed
the importance of stability under environmental monitor-
ing and the redundancy of records in many subsystems
for an operational definition of objectivity [58, 59]. Both
of these are examples of weak objectivity.
A strongly objective theory does not rely upon the
concept of emergence as it is usually understood. Of
course, any scientific theory must declare some things
to be irrelevant in order to identify regularities, but in
a strongly objective theory it is assumed that meaning-
ful regularities can be identified by declaring arbitrar-
ily small quantities of information to be irrelevant, so
that nothing qualitatively new (e.g., quantum state re-
duction) need emerge. Bell advocated strong objectivity
as the target for all respectable formulations of quantum
mechanics [4].
However, it seems unlikely that protoscientists could
ever evolve if their information gathering is limited to
arbitrarily weak regularities. There is not much profit
in defining a “law” for regularities that are arbitrarily
few and far between. To get the scientific enterprise
off the ground, something more seems to be required—
something qualitatively new. This suggests that the con-
cept of emergence may be unavoidable—a conclusion sup-
ported by the above observation that no examples of
theories that are both empirically validated and non-
emergent are known to exist at present.
Weak objectivity is therefore taken to be the primary
goal of the present theory. Intersubjectivity would be
allowed as a fallback position, but only if weak objectivity
is found to be unattainable.
IV. THE REDUCTION PROCESS
Let us now consider the mathematical formulation of
the measurement problem. The time evolution of the
density operator ρ of a closed system is given by the
Schro¨dinger equation as
ρ(tb) = U(tb, ta)ρ(ta)U(ta, tb), (1)
in which ρ(t) is the value of ρ at time t, U(t, t′) =
exp[−iH(t − t′)/~] is the time evolution operator, H is
the Hamiltonian of the system, and ρ is assumed to be
normalized (tr ρ = 1).
A. von Neumann reduction
However, according to von Neumann [1], this unitary
evolution is suspended during an ideal “projective” mea-
surement of the operator
Λ =
∑
i
λiPi, (2)
in which Pi is a projection operator of rank one (di ≡
trPi = 1). These projectors are idempotent, hermitian,
mutually orthogonal, and exhaustive:
P 2i = Pi = P
†
i , PiPj = δijPi,
∑
i
Pi = 1. (3)
The measurement effectively asks a set of yes–no
questions—namely, whether the state ρ will be found to
match the vector subspace defined by Pi. At the time of
the measurement, the unitary process (1) is replaced by
the two-stage reduction process
ρ→ ρˆ =
∑
i
wiρi, (4a)
ρˆ→ ρi, (4b)
5in which
wi = tr(ρPi) (5)
and
ρi = Pi (trPi = 1). (6)
The first stage (4a) accounts for the elimination of in-
terference, whereas the second stage (4b) describes the
selection of an individual outcome. The probability of
obtaining outcome (4b) is wi.
B. Lu¨ders reduction
Von Neumann assumed that the measurement was
maximally fine-grained in the sense that di = 1. How-
ever, the outcome of the measurement is then ambiguous
whenever the spectrum of Λ is degenerate (i.e., λi = λj
for i 6= j), because the corresponding projectors Pi and
Pj are not uniquely defined. To circumvent this problem,
Lu¨ders [60] replaced the reduced state (6) with
ρi =
PiρPi
wi
(wi 6= 0), (7)
in which di ≥ 1 is now allowed, but it is assumed that
λi 6= λj for i 6= j. The probability of outcome (7) is still
given by Eq. (5). The Lu¨ders reduced state (7) minimizes
the change ρ→ ρˆ associated with a given projector set
P = {Pi | P †i Pj = δijPi,
∑
i
Pi = 1}. (8)
The Lu¨ders reduction rule has since been adopted almost
universally in textbooks (e.g., [61, 62]) for the case of
projective measurements.
The Lu¨ders rule is sometimes attributed to von Neu-
mann [2, 63]. However, von Neumann took a different
approach to this problem that is rooted in epistemol-
ogy rather than conservation of ρ. Since von Neumann’s
method [36] is rarely used in modern work on the mea-
surement problem, discussion of his approach will be
postponed to Sec. VII.
C. Closed systems
In traditional presentations of the theory of measure-
ment, reduction is applied to an open system when it is
“measured” from the outside by some other system that
is not included in the quantum-mechanical description.
In this paper, however, the theory is applied exclusively
to closed systems in which measurement is just one type
of interaction between subsystems. The projector set P
describes properties of subsystems that are of interest to
some protoscientist within the system, although the pro-
toscientist may or may not be included explicitly as a
subsystem (or a set of subsystems) in the mathematical
definition of P. The objective is to find a way to formu-
late the reduction process as emergent, so that its conflict
with the unitary dynamics (1) can be neglected.
It is assumed throughout that the information acces-
sible to the protoscientist is limited to the outcomes (7)
and their associated Born-rule probabilities (5). How-
ever, at the outset, {wi} is to be regarded as just a set
of numbers derived from the mathematical structure of
Hilbert space. This set satisfies wi ≥ 0 and
∑
i wi = 1 by
definition, but the concept of probability will emerge only
after further theoretical developments. Nevertheless, in
the interest of avoiding tortuous linguistic constructions,
the language of probability theory will be used hence-
forth, interspersed with occasional comments indicating
the progress along the path to emergence.
D. Subsystem projectors
The projector Pi is henceforth defined as a product of
subsystem projectors:
Pi =
⊗
k
P˜kik =
∏
k
Pkik , (9)
in which k labels the subsystems and ik is the k com-
ponent of i = (i1, i2, . . .). Pkik is an extension of the
subsystem projector P˜kik to the entire system:
Pkik = 11 ⊗ · · · 1k−1 ⊗ P˜kik ⊗ 1k+1 · · · ⊗ 1n, (10)
in which 1k is the identity operator for subsystem k and
the set {P˜kik} satisfies
P˜ †kik P˜kjk = δikjk P˜kik ,
∑
ik
P˜kik = 1k. (11)
The rank of Pi is thus di =
∏
k dkik , in which
dkik = tr P˜kik 6= trPkik . (12)
The dimension of the subspace corresponding to subsys-
tem k is
dk =
∑
ik
dkik = tr 1k. (13)
E. Microstates, macrostates, collective variables,
and internal environments
In a typical measurement situation, the time evolution
(1) generates correlations between the microstates of a
subsystem k and the macrostates of a measuring appa-
ratus k′. Microstates and macrostates are just vector
subspaces of different dimensions (dkik = 1, dk′ik′  1).
For example, a macrostate may be defined as the set of
all microstates in which the center of mass of the ap-
paratus pointer lies within some given range of coordi-
nates. The variables used to define the macrostate are
6called collective variables. For a macroscopic subsystem,
the collective variables are often described by commuting
operators that approximate the values of noncommuting
observables, such as the center-of-mass position and mo-
mentum [1, 5, 64–67].
Other important collective variables include the order
parameters for states of broken symmetry, which describe
the emergence of distinct phases of matter [68]. These
order parameters exhibit a generalized “rigidity” prop-
erty [68, 69] that is said to arise from a “quantum pro-
tectorate” [23]. Such generalized rigidities are useful in
defining the “pointer” variables of actual or hypothetical
measuring apparatuses [68, 69].
The different microstates within a given macrostate
can be labeled using a set of internal variables. For ex-
ample, suppose a hydrogen atom is known to occupy a
subsystem consisting of a given volume in space. Suitable
collective and internal coordinates are then the atomic
center-of-mass position and the relative electron–proton
separation, respectively. In textbooks, the Hilbert space
of the hydrogen atom is usually decomposed into a ten-
sor product of independent center-of-mass and relative
coordinate spaces. This cannot be done exactly in the
present example, because in a finite-volume subsystem,
the set of possible relative coordinates depends on the po-
sition of the center of mass. Decomposing a subsystem
into a tensor product of collective and internal subsys-
tems therefore represents an approximation that may be
emergent in certain limiting cases (such as, in this exam-
ple, bound states of the hydrogen atom that are not too
close to the subsystem boundaries).
If such a tensor-product decomposition is emergent,
the internal subsystem is sometimes viewed as an internal
environment of the collective subsystem. The collective
subsystem then has both external and internal environ-
ments. The notion of an internal environment can also be
used in a loose sense even when no such tensor-product
decomposition is performed.
F. Integrated and isolated subsystems
A subsystem is said to be isolated if it interacts very
weakly with other subsystems, so that its time evolution
is nearly unitary, apart perhaps from occasional strong
interactions with a measuring apparatus. A closed sys-
tem, by contrast, interacts with nothing else at all.
Most macroscopic subsystems are practically impossi-
ble to isolate [70]; isolation is therefore typically asso-
ciated with microscopic subsystems. Exceptions to this
rule include the subsystems associated with the phase or-
der parameter of a superfluid or superconductor. A sub-
system that is never isolated on any relevant timescale is
referred to here as an integrated subsystem. Integrated
subsystems are important for irreversibility in statisti-
cal mechanics [71] and the quantum theory of measure-
ment [70, 72, 73]. Sometimes it is convenient to use
the words “macroscopic” and “microscopic” as imprecise
substitutes for “integrated” and “isolated,” but the lat-
ter labels are used preferentially in the discussion that
follows.
G. Ideal observers
One motivation sometimes given for the definition of
macrostates is that a protoscientist or “macroscopic ob-
server” [36] is assumed to be capable of distinguishing
pure states in the subspace defined by Pi from those in
a different subspace Pj , but incapable of distinguishing
different states within a given subspace Pi. The set (8)
could thus be regarded as characterizing the capabili-
ties of such an observer [36]. However, if the theory is
to achieve the goal of being weakly objective (cf. Sec.
III) rather than subjective, the macrostate projectors Pi
should be far more fine-grained than the resolving capa-
bilities of any protoscientist using the theory [54].
The projectors in a weakly objective theory can thus
be taken to characterize the capabilities of an ideal ob-
server whose powers of perception far exceed those of any
existing protoscientist. Such an ideal observer is referred
to here as a Gell-Mann–Hartle [74] (GMH) demon. This
demon is of course imaginary. But the GMH demon, un-
like Maxwell’s or Laplace’s demon, could exist, at least
in principle, within the confines of ordinary quantum me-
chanics.
In this paper, the word “information” generally refers
to the information accessible to a GMH demon (thus an-
swering Bell’s question [13] “whose information?” [75]).
Of course, the only actual information is that held by in-
dividual protoscientists. The GMH demon is just an ide-
alization useful for describing the collective information
potentially accessible to the community of protoscientists
in a manner consistent with the goal of weak objectivity.
The relationship between the GMH demon and the pro-
toscientists is discussed further in Sec. XI.
H. Restriction to integrated subsystems
The definition (9) of Pi as a product of subsystem pro-
jectors implicitly assumes that the reduction process con-
sists of n reductions applied simultaneously to each of
the individual subsystems. However, as discussed below
in Sec. V, the time interval ∆t between reductions in a
closed system must satisfy
∆t τdec, (14)
in which τdec is the decoherence time. This gives rise
to a potential problem, in that different subsystems k
generally have different decoherence times τdec(k). The
timescale τdec in Eq. (14) for the simultaneous subsystem
reduction generated by Pi must therefore be understood
as the upper bound
τdec = max
k
τdec(k). (15)
7Although τdec(k) is very small for typical macroscopic
subsystems [9, 30–33], it is very large (effectively infi-
nite) for isolated subsystems. For this reason, the com-
pound projector (9) is initially assumed to include only
integrated subsystems, and Pkik is assumed to refer only
to macrostates. The special case of subsystem decom-
positions involving isolated subsystems will be treated
separately in Sec. IX.
Note that this temporary restriction to integrated sub-
systems does not mean that Schro¨dinger-cat-type prob-
lems cannot be described; it only means that any isolated
subsystem must be absorbed into the definition of some
integrated subsystem, rather than being treated as a sep-
arate entity.
I. Non-projective measurements
Measurements can also be described by operators that
are not projectors, as part of the quantum operations
formalism for open systems [76, 77]. However, such mea-
surement operators are always equivalent to projectors
acting in a larger Hilbert space. Since the present work
deals only with closed systems, all measurements are
taken here to be projective for simplicity. Nevertheless,
the effect of such a measurement on an isolated subsys-
tem of the closed system generally cannot be described
using projection operators; this topic will be discussed
further in Sec. IX C.
J. Is reduction “real”?
In the modern language of the histories formalism
[54, 65–67, 78–82], the Lu¨ders reduction is considered to
be not a “real” process but just a convenient way of de-
scribing the probabilities that are relevant to a protosci-
entist within the given closed system [83, 84]. This way
of thinking can be traced back to Everett [85–87] and
arguably even to von Neumann himself [88]. However,
any such “reduction-free” description must still explain
how it is possible for a protoscientist to perceive that its
experiences are described by the mathematics of reduc-
tion. Hence, the question of whether reduction should
be called “real” is irrelevant; the key question is whether
reduction is emergent.
V. EMERGENCE OF NONINTERFERENCE
The first step toward answering the latter question is
to tackle the interference problem. This problem arises
in the quantum-mechanical description of histories, the
simplest example of which is the double-slit experiment.
By convention, a “history” in quantum mechanics is often
formally defined as a time-ordered product of Heisenberg-
picture projection operators [54, 65–67, 78–82]. Suppose,
however, we define a history simply as a sequence of
Lu¨ders reductions applied at times t1 < t2 · · · < tf to
some initial state ρ(t0), where t0 ≤ t1 and ρ(t) evolves
unitarily between reductions. We can then construct a
probability distribution for these histories by applying
the rules of classical probability theory to the conditional
probabilities (5), without any need for the apparatus of
decoherence functionals [54, 80]. There is also no need
for consistency conditions [65–67, 78, 79], because the
sum rules of classical probability theory are satisfied au-
tomatically by construction.
However, this sequence of reductions can be used to
describe a closed system only if the reductions do not
interfere with each other. This means that, if we calcu-
late the probability of a given outcome at the final time
tf , conditioned on the given initial state ρ(t0) but on no
other information, we should get the same probability as
if the reductions at the intermediate times t1, t2, . . . , tf−1
were not performed at all. Such a complete lack of inter-
ference is never exactly true for any problem of practical
relevance, but it becomes a very good approximation in
the limit (14), in which ∆t = ∆tj = tj − tj−1 is the time
interval between reductions. The decoherence time τdec
is state-dependent, but it is very fast for typical macro-
scopic subsystems. The resulting emergence of noninter-
ference on the timescale (14) is the fundamental practical
lesson of decoherence theory [9, 30–33]. Within the limits
defined by Eq. (14), reduction processes at intermediate
times can be inserted or deleted without having any sig-
nificant effect on the overall probability distribution.
Of course, the emergence of noninterference depends
very sensitively on the choice of projector set P(tj). The
problem of defining suitable criteria for the selection of
this set is known as the preferred-basis problem. Methods
for addressing this problem are discussed in Sec. X.
As a summary of what has just been done, the rules
for combining probabilities in classical probability theory
were injected (from out of nowhere) into the formalism
as a possible candidate for emergence. An appeal to the
results of decoherence theory was then used to establish
that such emergence (i.e., of the rules for combining prob-
abilities) does indeed occur in the limit (14), subject to
the solution of the preferred-basis problem.
However, this emergence of noninterference does not
imply the emergence of all of classical probability theory,
because it does not imply the emergence of outcomes.
The reason for this that noninterference is a property of
probability distributions for histories, whereas the out-
come of the reduction process is a quantum state. As
shown below, the change of state during the Lu¨ders re-
duction is generally not small enough to be described as
emergent.
VI. TESTING CANDIDATES FOR THE
EMERGENCE OF OUTCOMES
To test for the emergence of outcomes, we need to de-
termine how much the state changes upon reduction. A
8convenient measure for this is the trace distance [77, 89]
D(ρ, σ) =
1
2
tr|ρ− σ|, (16)
in which |X| =
√
X†X. Some bounds on the relevant
distances for the Lu¨ders reduction are evaluated in Ap-
pendix A for the case in which ρ is a pure state (i.e.,
ρ2 = ρ). As shown there, neither D(ρ, ρˆ) nor D(ρ, ρi) is
small for the general case in which more than one value of
wi is significant. This was to be expected, since otherwise
the measurement problem would be trivial.
A. Emergence of determinism
Consider, however, the special case in which one out-
come, say i = 1, is dominant: w1 = 1 − ,   1. As
shown in Appendix A, D(ρ, ρˆ) and D(ρ, ρ1) both van-
ish in the limit  → 0, whereas D(ρ, ρi6=1) approaches 1.
Thus, in this limit, the states ρ and ρ1 are the same. If
we agree to ignore all outcomes except i = 1, we can say
that deterministic behavior has emerged. In this limit wi
is either 0 or 1, so this corresponds to the emergence of
Boolean logic rather than of probability theory [65–67].
B. Collective variables and quasiclassical dynamics
The conditions needed to make this happen have been
studied by Omne`s [65–67]. It is possible only for certain
special states ρ and projector sets P, the latter of which
can be chosen so as to minimize D(ρ, ρˆ). The solution of
this variation problem is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
However, qualitatively correct solutions can often be
obtained without going into the details of the variation
problem. The key is to choose a set of collective vari-
ables that evolve slowly in time, so as to obtain approx-
imately classical behavior [1, 54, 64–67, 80, 81]. In gen-
eral, the concepts of symmetry breaking and order pa-
rameters play a crucial role in the selection of collective
variables (cf. Sec. IV E). However, in common “hydrody-
namic” situations the appropriate variables might simply
consist of the number of particles in a small but macro-
scopic volume together with the center-of-mass position,
total momentum, and internal energy of those particles.
Once the quasiclassical variables have been chosen, sub-
system projectors (10) can be defined corresponding to
some given ranges of these variables and combined to
obtain the overall projector (9).
The resulting emergence of quasiclassical determin-
ism is valid for systems whose behavior can be pre-
dicted accurately using classical mechanics [65–67]. It is,
however, not valid for classically chaotic systems or for
“Schro¨dinger cat” situations in which, say, w1 = w2 =
1/2. In these cases, D(ρ, ρˆ) and D(ρ, ρi) are not small
and we must turn to other methods.
C. Change of metric
The crucial step in all cases of emergence is the choice
of what to ignore. Given that the physical predictions
of quantum mechanics are all based on probabilities, this
choice can be made explicit by defining the quantity
DQ(ρ, σ) = sup
P∈Q
|tr[P (ρ− σ)]|, (17)
in which Q is some given set of projectors [90]. The
physical meaning of this definition can be seen by noting
that for any two density operators ρ and σ,
DQ(ρ, σ) = 0 ⇔ ∀P ∈ Q, tr(Pρ) = tr(Pσ). (18)
The condition DQ(ρ, σ) = 0 is thus identical to the state-
ment that ρ and σ give rise to the same probabilities for
measurements of any projectors P ∈ Q. If measurements
are restricted to observables that are linear combinations
of these projectors, the density operators ρ and σ would
therefore be operationally indistinguishable [16, 91].
The definition (17) is related to the trace distance (16)
by [77, 89]
DQ(ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ), (19)
in which the equality holds for all ρ and σ if and only if
Q is dense in Q0, the set of all projectors. If this is not
true, DQ(ρ, σ) is called a pseudometric, because it satis-
fies all of the criteria for a metric except the requirement
that DQ(ρ, σ) = 0 implies ρ = σ. It can be converted
into a metric if we regard it as defining a distance be-
tween equivalence classes, where ρ and σ belong to the
same equivalence class if DQ(ρ, σ) = 0. The subject of
equivalence classes is discussed below in Sec. VII.
D. Macroscopically local observables
A common choice for Q is the set L of projectors con-
tained in the algebra of local (or quasilocal) “observ-
ables.” In algebraic quantum mechanics, such observ-
ables are defined as operators with compact support in
coordinate space (or, for relativistic problems, Minkowski
space) [92, 93]. This definition is appropriate for mathe-
matical investigations of limiting behavior [92–96], but it
is not suitable for use in any realistic theory of measure-
ment. For the latter purpose, it is better to work with
the algebra of macroscopically local observables, defined
as those with a fixed upper bound on the spatial extent
of nonlocality [97, 98].
Gottfried has given an insightful analysis of the mea-
surement problem in which this set is applied to the case
of a Stern–Gerlach experiment that measures the spin of
an atom [98]. In his approach, the initial state ρ(ta) at
time ta is the outcome of a state-preparation or reduc-
tion process. This state evolves in accordance with Eq.
(1) until tb = ta + ∆t, at which time ρ(tb) is reduced to
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show that this reduction is justified by the fact that
DL[ρ(tb), ρˆ(tb)] ≈ 0 (20)
for sufficiently large ∆t, in which L is the set of pro-
jectors contained in the algebra of macroscopically local
observables. In order to achieve this, the projector set
Pb = P(tb) is chosen so as to partition the center of mass
of the atom into macroscopically distinct regions. This
could be regarded as the solution of a variation problem,
in which Pb is varied so as to minimize DL[ρ(tb), ρˆ(tb)].
If we accept Gottfried’s claim that “all known ob-
servables” are macroscopically local [98], the result (20)
would seem to be an important first step (but not a
complete solution—see Sec. VII) towards establishing the
emergence of outcomes, at least in this special case. How-
ever, this claim made Bell “quite uncomfortable” [13],
and for good reason. The explicit reference to locality in
coordinate space is a statement about what is observable
to humans. The preferred-basis problem is thereby not
solved, it is merely eliminated by fiat.
However, as Anderson has stressed, the “pointer” of a
measuring apparatus need not point to anything in coor-
dinate space; it could, at least in principle, be based on a
generalized concept of “rigidity” involving, say, the phase
variable of liquid helium [68, 69]. Such phases can only
be perceived by humans if they are measured by a more
traditional apparatus whose pointer is macroscopically
local in coordinate space [99], but Anderson speculates
that they could perhaps be perceived directly by a com-
puter “made entirely out of Josephson junctions” [69].
The reference to macroscopic locality thus introduces
a subjective element into the theory. It is desirable to see
whether this element of subjectivity can be eliminated by
defining Q in a different way.
E. Are local “observables” actually observed?
Another reason to be uncomfortable with relying on
the set L is that the projectors in L do not always cor-
respond directly to the outcome of any experiment. The
experimentally accessible quantities in quantum mechan-
ics are (with some qualifications to be explored in detail
below) the reduced states ρi and their associated prob-
abilities wi. These quantities are directly related to the
projectors Pi appearing in the set Pb referred to above.
However, these projectors do not necessarily belong to L;
as noted above, the set Pb is defined by the requirement
that it minimize DL[ρ(tb), ρˆ(tb)], not by membership in
L. In the language of algebraic quantum mechanics, the
set Pb that defines the basis in which ρ(tb) and ρˆ(tb) be-
come equivalent in the sense of Eq. (20) belongs to the
set of macroscopic classical observables, not to the set of
local observables [94–96]. The former is generally not a
subset of the latter [94–96].
Hence, the choice Q = L represents somewhat of a
diversion from the physical motivation given for the in-
troduction of DQ(ρ, σ), because the probabilities associ-
ated with projectors in L are not necessarily probabil-
ities of any experimental outcome. The “observables”
in L are thus actually a class of (partially) hidden vari-
ables introduced in order to facilitate the solution of the
measurement problem. But this calls into question the
significance of the results obtained from minimization of
DL(ρ, σ).
It is therefore of interest to see whether the problem
can be reformulated in terms of a set Q that is more
closely connected to experimental outcomes. This can
be achieved by replacing the criterion of macroscopic lo-
cality with that of dynamical stability, as outlined below.
F. Dynamical stability
The concept of dynamical stability has played an im-
portant role in decoherence theory from the very begin-
ning [70, 100]. It has roots in the criteria of stability [101]
and predictability [102] used to define notions of “real-
ity” by the founders of quantum mechanics. Dynamical
stability can be implemented here by replacing the choice
Q = L in Sec. VI D with Q = Pa, where Pa = P(ta) is
the set of projectors used in the reduction process that
generated the initial state ρ(ta).
The reason why this corresponds to a criterion
of dynamical stability can be seen by noting that
DPa [ρ(tb), ρˆ(tb)] = 0 if Pb = Pa, due to the idempotence
of the Lu¨ders reduction process. In general, P must de-
pend on time, so we have at best
DPa [ρ(tb), ρˆ(tb)] ≈ 0 (21)
when Pb ≈ Pa. This corresponds to the case of projectors
that vary slowly with time, in the sense that the interval
∆t between reductions can be chosen to satisfy [cf. Eq.
(14)]
τdec  ∆t τP , (22)
where τP is the timescale for changes in P. Hence, the
criterion (21) can be used to select projector sets P that
are stable over time intervals long in comparison to the
decoherence time.
Unlike the situation in Sec. VI D, here the set Pb is not
regarded as a quantity to be varied in order to minimize
DPa [ρ(tb), ρˆ(tb)], because that would yield only the triv-
ial time-independent solution Pb = Pa. The selection of
Pb (i.e., the solution of the preferred-basis problem) is
instead governed by a separate variational principle.
For the moment, the preferred-basis problem is set
aside, to be taken up again in Sec. X. The question of
immediate concern is, rather, what precisely is the out-
come of the reduction process?
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VII. EMERGENCE OF OUTCOMES IN
INTEGRATED SUBSYSTEMS
A. Density operators have too much information
This question would seem to have an obvious answer:
The outcome at time tj is the reduced state ρi in Eq. (7).
The problem with this answer is that we never actually
know what ρi(tj) is; we only know that it is some state
that belongs to the manifold
Mi(tj) = {σ | Pi(tj)σ = σPi(tj) = σ}. (23)
Whatever this state is, it then evolves unitarily until
the time of the next reduction, yielding another un-
known state ρ(tj+1). The only connection between the
pre-reduction state ρ(tj+1) and experiment is the set
{wi(tj+1)}, in which wi(tj+1) is the predicted probability
(5) of obtaining an outcome in Mi(tj+1).
The outcome of an experiment is therefore ill-defined
if we take the quantum state to be a density operator ρ.
The crux of the problem is that ρ contains too much infor-
mation. As noted in Sec. VI C, the operator ρ would be
completely determined if we knew the value of tr(Pρ) for
a complete set of projectors P [5, 103]. This information
can be obtained for an assembly of open isolated systems
by the technique known as quantum-state tomography,
as described in Sec. IX E.
However, we [104] never have access to complete infor-
mation about the state of a closed system [105]. In such
a system, which is by definition unique, we can only ob-
tain information about ρ at the reduction times tj . The
information thus obtained is limited to the outcomesMi,
which can be used to test the probabilities wi calculated
from Eq. (5). That is, our experimental information can
only make contact with the values of tr(Pρ) for all P ∈ P,
in which P is the set (8) used to perform the reduction.
This set is not fixed a priori ; it is contingent upon the
dynamical solution of the preferred-basis problem (see
Sec. X). But at any given time, we have access to the
values of tr(Pρ) only for one particular set P, not for all
conceivable sets P. (This is also true for an ensemble
of open integrated systems, as discussed in Sec. VIII.)
This is the basic limitation imposed by Bohr’s principle
of complementarity [106], which can be summarized in
the statement that “unperformed experiments have no
results” [107].
B. Equivalence classes
If all of the information we have about ρ at some given
time is contained in the set of probabilities {wi} in Eq.
(5), then we cannot distinguish ρ from any other state σ
that gives rise to the same set {wi}. This indistinguisha-
bility can be expressed by defining an equivalence rela-
tion between density operators. We say that ρ and σ are
equivalent with respect to the set P, denoted ρ ∼ σ (P),
if DP(ρ, σ) = 0 or [cf. Eq. (18)]
tr(Pρ) = tr(Pσ) ∀P ∈ P. (24a)
The equivalence class of ρ with respect to P is then de-
fined as the set
[ρ] = {σ | σ ∼ ρ (P)}. (24b)
The motivation for this is that an ideal but physically
possible observer—a GMH demon—is assumed to be ca-
pable of distinguishing states in the manifold Mi from
those in another manifold Mj , but incapable of distin-
guishing different states withinMi. The set (8) can thus
be regarded as characterizing the capabilities of the GMH
demon. All states σ ∈ [ρ] are indistinguishable to the de-
mon. If we wish to obtain a description that is logically
consistent with the capabilities of even such an ideal ob-
server, we should therefore redefine the quantum state as
the equivalence class [ρ] itself [36–38].
Note that the definition of quantum states as equiva-
lence classes is already well established as a basic feature
of standard quantum mechanics. For example, in ordi-
nary wave mechanics, the so-called “wave function” is
actually an equivalence class of functions that are equal
almost everywhere (i.e., except on sets of Lebesgue mea-
sure zero) [108]. More generally, the quantum state is
defined as a probability measure on a set of projectors
[109]. Under certain conditions, this definition leads to a
one-to-one correspondence between quantum states and
density operators [109]. However, in systems with exact
superselection rules, this correspondence is broken, and
the quantum state can only be identified as an equiv-
alence class of density operators [110]. It is therefore
not surprising that the same should be true in systems
with emergent environment-induced superselection rules
[31, 111].
The equivalence class (24) has several noteworthy
properties. For any density operator ρ we have
[ρˆ] = [ρ], (25)
in which ρˆ is the Lu¨ders reduced state defined in Eqs.
(4a) and (7). That is, ρ and ρˆ are always equivalent.
However, there are significant advantages to redefining ρˆ
at this point as [36]
ρˆ =
∑
i
tr(ρPi)
trPi
Pi, (26)
thereby extending von Neumann’s original definition [see
Eqs. (4a) and (6)] to the case of trPi ≥ 1. This defini-
tion still satisfies Eq. (25), but it also satisfies the much
stronger condition
[ρ] = [σ] ⇔ ρˆ = σˆ, (27)
as shown in Appendix B. Hence, under the new defini-
tion, there is a one-to-one relationship between equiva-
lence classes [ρ] and reduced states ρˆ. The von Neumann
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reduced state (26) can therefore be used to represent the
equivalence class [ρ], subject to some qualifications about
dynamics to be discussed below in Sec. VII C.
The uniqueness of the reduced state (26) is also re-
flected in the maximum-entropy property
S(ρˆ) ≥ S(σ) ∀σ ∈ [ρ], (28)
in which
S(ρ) = − tr(ρ ln ρ) (29)
is the von Neumann entropy [1]. The property (28) is a
consequence of Eq. (27) and the inequality [36]
S(ρˆ) ≥ S(ρ), (30)
the latter of which also holds for the Lu¨ders reduced state
[77]. The equality in (28) or (30) holds if and only if σ = ρˆ
or ρ = ρˆ [36], respectively.
Further properties of the definition (26) are easily de-
rived. For the special case of a projector in the set P, we
get simply
Pˆi = Pi, (31)
which implies that the operation (26) is idempotent:
ˆˆρ = ρˆ. (32)
Also, for any pure state χi that belongs to the manifold
Mi defined by Pi, we have
χˆi =
Pi
trPi
. (33)
Given that the equivalence class [ρ] can be represented
mathematically by the reduced state ρˆ, these results in-
dicate that the basic dynamical entity of the theory is
not the pure state but the projector Pi. This projector
represents its own equivalence class, due to Eq. (31).
C. Modified reduction process
If we follow this approach, the Lu¨ders reduced state
(7) in the reduction process (4) should be replaced by
ρi =
Pi
di
, (34)
in which di = trPi. This is just a generalization of von
Neumann’s reduced state (6) to the case di ≥ 1. The
reduction process defined by Eqs. (4) and (34) could be
regarded as implicit in von Neumann’s work, because he
devoted a significant portion of Ref. [1] to a study of the
implications of the reduced state (26) for the increase of
entropy predicted by the second law of thermodynamics
[36]. However, von Neumann always wrote his reduction
process in the form of Eqs. (4) and (6), with di = 1.
To the best of my knowledge, the first authors to write
down Eqs. (4) and (34) explicitly were Daneri, Loinger,
and Prosperi [112] (see also Refs. [95, 113]). In view of
this ambiguous heritage, I shall refer to this process as
the vN–DLP reduction.
There is a subtlety here in that different members of an
equivalence class are not equivalent with respect to dy-
namics, because the projectors Pi generally do not com-
mute with the Hamiltonian H [36]. Different members
of an initial equivalence class therefore evolve differently
during the time interval between reductions, and at the
time of the next reduction they will generally belong to
different equivalence classes. This dynamical lack of in-
formation can be accounted for by introducing a proba-
bility distribution over the different members σi ∈ [ρi] of
the equivalence class [ρi] that defines the actual state of
the system at the time of reduction. However, the intro-
duction of such a probability distribution is equivalent
to choosing to represent the reduced state [ρi] by some
other specific mixed state σi ∈ [ρi] with σi 6= ρi.
Defining this probability distribution requires the in-
troduction of some new principle that is foreign to quan-
tum mechanics per se. One possible candidate is the
principle of maximum entropy, which in an information-
theory context represents the policy of being “maximally
noncommittal with regard to missing information” [114].
But according to Eq. (28) this corresponds to the choice
σi = ρˆi = ρi, thus leading back once again to the formu-
lation given in Eq. (34). This choice is adopted in what
follows.
D. Emergence of classical probability
The crucial question now is whether the reduction pro-
cess defined by Eqs. (4) and (34) is emergent. To address
this question, note that the essential information content
of the equivalence class (24) is contained in the set of
probabilities {wi}, which can be represented by a vector
w = (w1, w2, . . .). (35)
All states ρ in the same equivalence class have the same
w vector, so w is a characteristic of [ρ] itself. The dis-
tance ∆([ρ], [ρ′]) between equivalence classes [ρ] and [ρ′]
can then be defined as the Kolmogorov distance [115] or
classical trace distance [77] between w and w′:
∆([ρ], [ρ′]) =
1
2
‖w −w′‖1 (36a)
=
1
2
∑
i
|wi − w′i|. (36b)
As noted above, [ρ] can also be represented mathemati-
cally by ρˆ. But ρˆ and ρˆ′ commute (for fixed P), so the
trace distance (16) between them is identical to Eq. (36):
D(ρˆ, ρˆ′) =
1
2
∑
i
|wi − w′i|. (37)
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Hence, these two measures of distance are the same. The
essential difference between the representations ρˆ and w
of [ρ] is that ρˆ can be used as an initial condition for the
unitary dynamics (1), whereas w cannot.
From these results we see immediately that
∆([ρ], [ρˆ]) = 0, (38)
because [ρ] = [ρˆ]. Thus, the redefinition of quantum
states as equivalence classes has led to the vanishing of
the difference between the entangled state (1) and the
corresponding reduced state (26). It should be noted that
Eq. (38) has not appeared here entirely out of the blue;
it was preceded by the very similar dynamical-stability
condition shown in Eq. (21). Hence, in defining equiv-
alence classes such that the distance ∆([ρ], [ρˆ]) vanishes
exactly, we are only choosing to neglect a small quantity
that was already shown to be negligible according to the
criterion of dynamical stability.
The first stage (4a) of the reduction process is therefore
emergent. But this is sufficient to establish the emergence
of outcomes, because the interpretation of ρˆ as a statis-
tical mixture of distinct outcomes can now be imposed
on Eq. (26) without generating any noticeable conflict
with unitary dynamics—in which “noticeable” is defined
with respect to the metrics (36) and (37). It should be
stressed that this interpretation is imposed on Eq. (26),
not derived from it. Bell has argued that it would be
more natural to interpret equations of the type (26) as
a simultaneous coexistence of the projectors Pi—i.e., to
interpret the summation in Eq. (26) as a classical “and”
rather than a classical “or” [13]. But this argument only
carries weight if we assume that our goal is to derive
the emergent theory from the base-level theory. It is
not. This is never the goal in any true case of emergence,
which always requires reconciliation of contradictions be-
tween the two levels of theory.
Here it may also be objected [13] that this is “not the
proof of a theorem, but a change of the theory—at a
strategically well chosen point.” In other words, we have
only managed to win the game by moving the goalposts.
This is true, but it is also true that this is always how
the game of emergence is played and won. Nothing ever
emerges until we have chosen what to ignore.
The interpretation of ρˆ as a statistical mixture means
that the Hilbert-space weights wi in Eq. (5) have now
emerged as classical probabilities. However, because the
closed system under consideration is not a member of
any ensemble, they are probabilities only in the Bayesian
sense of plausible reasoning in the face of incomplete in-
formation [116, 117], not in the “frequentist” sense of
frequencies in an ensemble. But in order to connect wi
with experiment, it is necessary to introduce ensembles
and statistical frequencies. This connection will be de-
veloped below in Sec. VIII.
The second stage (4b) of the vN–DLP reduction ac-
counts for the selection of one outcome ρi from among
the many possibilities present in ρˆ. The distance (36)
corresponding to this process is
∆([ρˆ], [ρi]) = 1− wi. (39)
This becomes small only in the deterministic limit wi ≈ 1
considered previously in Sec. VI A. It is not small for the
general case in which no value of wi is close to 1. But
this simply means that the change in a probability dis-
tribution is always significant whenever we update it to
account for the acquisition of new information (where
new information is, by definition, considered to be unex-
pected). It has no bearing on the emergence of outcomes,
because the outcomes have already emerged.
E. Meaning of the results
What is the meaning of the vN–DLP reduction pro-
cess? Here an analogy with statistical mechanics is again
helpful. In the context of Gibbs’s famous ink-in-water
example [53], the Schro¨dinger dynamics (1) generates a
mixing of these fluids. But due to the conservation of the
eigenvalues of ρ by the unitary process (1)—analogous to
the incompressibility of the fluids—it is well known that
the second law of thermodynamics can only be recov-
ered if the microscopic state of the fluid is repeatedly
“reduced” by coarse graining or some other type of in-
formation loss [57, 73, 118]. The Lu¨ders reduction is one
example of this type of coarse graining.
However, if the state of the system is to be described by
equivalence classes, we should take the reduced states ρˆ
and ρi to be given not by the specific expressions (4a)
and (7) but by the corresponding equivalence classes.
The introduction of equivalence classes thus represents
a further stage of coarse graining, in which the excess in-
formation contained in Eq. (7) is discarded. In practice,
however, this cumbersome two-step coarse-graining pro-
cess is jettisoned in favor of the single definition (34). It
was precisely this question of agreement with the second
law of thermodynamics that motivated von Neumann to
consider the reduced state (26).
In the Lu¨ders reduction, some coherence between the
components of the initial quantum state ρ generally sur-
vives the reduction process, as long as trPi > 1. For
the quasiclassical projectors that describe our everyday
experiences, typically ρ “is not reduced very much” [83].
However, in the vN–DLP reduction, the initial state ρ
is replaced in its entirety by a normalized projector (34)
at each reduction. The state prior to the last reduction
is completely forgotten. In other words, all information
about what is going on inside the equivalence classes is
renounced at each step of the process. This is in bet-
ter accord with the information-theory principle of being
“maximally noncommittal with regard to missing infor-
mation” [114].
Of course, given that the projectors Pi describe the
capabilities of the GMH demon, any protoscientist using
the theory will describe the experimental outcome as a
partial reduction that is intermediate between (4a) and
13
(4b). That is, the empirical reduced state will be a statis-
tical mixture of states ρi that is narrower than Eq. (4a)
but still includes many different ρi.
Zeh has cautioned against interpreting the reduction
process as a “mere increase of information” [30, 57, 119,
120], in the sense of merely selecting an outcome from
some preexisting ensemble. One reason for this is that
applying reduction to a closed system when decoherence
is not yet complete (i.e., when the “measurement” is still
in practice reversible) leads to results in conflict with
experiment [121]. Another reason is that the outcomes
are not preexisting; they emerge dynamically from the
solutions of the preferred-basis problem (see Sec. X).
Bub has suggested that arguments for the equivalence
of ρ and ρˆ cannot solve the measurement problem, be-
cause ρ and ρˆ are equivalent “only from the point of view
of a specific observer” [122]. However, in the present the-
ory, this observer is the GMH demon, thereby establish-
ing the weak objectivity of the theory. The equivalence
of ρ and ρˆ is also bolstered by the criterion of dynamical
stability developed in Sec. VI F. If one insists on noth-
ing less than strong objectivity, then it is true that the
measurement problem is insoluble. But as argued in Sec.
III, the requirement of strong objectivity is incompatible
with the scientific method itself.
Von Neumann showed that the reduction defined by
Eqs. (4a) and (34) can be written mathematically as a
product of two maximally fine-grained reductions of type
(6), in which the rank-one projectors within each equiv-
alence class are chosen to form complementary sets and
the time interval ∆t between reductions is set to zero [36].
Such a product has been called a “coherence destroying”
measurement [63]. However, it must be stressed that the
vN–DLP reduction cannot be interpreted physically as
a sequence of two conventional measurements, because
∆t cannot be zero for measurements of noncommuting
observables [78] [recall ∆t  τdec in Eq. (22)]. The
limit ∆t → 0 is a singular limit that gives rise to new
physics—in this case, a conventional reduction followed
by a renouncement of all information that would distin-
guish between the states within an equivalence class.
It is interesting to note that when the reduction pro-
cess is defined by Eqs. (4) and (34), both the quantum
state and all observables of the type (2) are functions
of the projectors Pi. The emergence of outcomes in a
set of integrated subsystems thus leads to a convergence
between Schro¨dinger’s concept of state and Heisenberg’s
concept of observable, in a manner highly reminiscent of
classical mechanics.
In a certain sense this may be considered as a triv-
ialization of the measurement problem [123], given the
longstanding focus on the question of how to deal with
the freedom of the experimenter to measure any of sev-
eral possibly noncommuting observables [76, 106, 124–
126]. However, it should be kept in mind that the pro-
jectors Pi are not arbitrary; they depend on the solu-
tion of the preferred-basis problem. As shown in Sec.
X, this problem can be formulated as a highly nontriv-
ial variation problem known as the predictability sieve.
Questions about the measurement of noncommuting ob-
servables are also relevant only in the case of isolated
subsystems, which have not yet been included in the the-
ory. This question will therefore be revisited in Sec. X E,
after the necessary concepts have been developed.
F. Historical remarks
Most of the ideas described in Sec. VII B were intro-
duced by von Neumann [36]. He discussed Eq. (26) ex-
tensively [36], but he always expressed his reduction rule
(4a) in terms of Eq. (6) rather than Eq. (34). However,
it seems clear that von Neumann thought of himself as
having formulated the latter rule [127]. Perhaps he did
not write it down explicitly because he considered the
concept of reduction to become trivial in this case (cf.
Jauch [37, 38]), due to the identity [ρ] = [ρˆ].
Jauch also strongly emphasized the importance of
equivalence classes for the measurement problem [37, 38].
However, he used the Lu¨ders reduction instead of the vN–
DLP reduction, which corresponds to a different kind of
equivalence class [43]. It is not clear whether this was
a deliberate choice, because Jauch did not mention von
Neumann’s prior work in this area. This is somewhat
surprising given that Jauch has acknowledged that much
of his research is an “elaboration of [the] work of von
Neumann” [128].
From a modern perspective, the main element miss-
ing from Jauch and von Neumann’s work on equivalence
classes is a connection with the concepts of decoherence
theory. Integrating these concepts into the theory leads
to a recognition that equivalence classes are contingent,
dynamically evolving entities and that integrated and iso-
lated subsystems must be treated differently (see Sec.
IX). Also, neither Jauch nor von Neumann used the cri-
terion of dynamical stability (cf. Sec. VI F) to motivate
their introduction of equivalence classes.
Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi [112] used ergodic the-
ory to derive the reduced state (34) from the time-
averaged dynamics of a microscopic system interact-
ing with a macroscopic apparatus (see also Prosperi
[95, 113]). However, in the present theory, Eq. (34) is
not used to describe isolated subsystems (see Sec. IX).
VIII. EMERGENCE OF STATISTICAL
FREQUENCIES
In the previous section, it was noted that, for the GMH
demon, the outcome of an experiment is to be identified
with the manifold Mi generated during the reduction
process, and the comparison between theory and exper-
iment is mediated entirely by the predicted set of prob-
abilities {wi}. However, up to this point, no connec-
tion between individual outcomes and probabilities has
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yet been established. The transition between these two
modes of description involves another level of emergence.
To describe this type of emergence, one must intro-
duce a qualitatively new concept, that of the ensemble.
This is most conveniently done by working with histories
(see Sec. V) and defining an ensemble of subhistories.
Each subhistory h is defined with reference to a partic-
ular subsystem and covers a finite interval of time. The
subhistories can be arranged in parallel (different sub-
systems during the same time interval) or in series (the
same subsystem during different time intervals) or any
combination of the two.
This physical ensemble is not yet a statistical ensem-
ble, because its subhistories are not independent. Each
subsystem in the parallel ensemble, for example, belongs
to the environment of all the others. Independence of
the ensemble elements can only be achieved if we declare
the interactions between them to be irrelevant; this is
put into practice by, in part, coarse-graining over the en-
vironment of each subsystem. Ignoring such differences
between subhistories is the key to converting a physical
ensemble into a (finite) statistical ensemble.
The definition of environments is therefore essential
to the construction of ensembles and, consequently, to
the gathering of information by “information gathering
and utilizing systems.” It is thus doubtful whether it
is possible to formulate a self-consistent theory of such
systems in which the concept of environment is dismissed
on the grounds that it is “artificial or poorly defined”
[129].
From this point on, the arguments leading to the emer-
gence of statistical frequencies are well known [85, 130–
135]. For example, one can define a frequency operator
for the ensemble [130–134], the eigenvalues of which be-
come ever more narrowly distributed around the Born-
rule subhistory probabilities wh as the number of ensem-
ble elements increases. In the limit of an infinite en-
semble, we can say that wh emerges as a well-defined
statistical frequency. The rules of classical probability
theory can then be used to compare these values with
the probabilities wi in Eq. (5).
But in order for this to have any meaning in a real
(finite) ensemble, we must agree to ignore all “maverick”
histories in which the observed frequencies deviate sub-
stantially from the norm. Such a choice is fundamental
to the concept of probability, and it cannot be derived
from anything else [134, 136]. That is, it represents a
true case of emergence.
Note that the statistical frequencies of the ensemble
can only be meaningfully compared with the subhistory
probabilities {wh} if the projector sets Ph are the same
for each subhistory in the ensemble. The limitation to
a single set of projectors discussed in Sec. VII A for the
case of a closed system is therefore also applicable to the
case of an ensemble of open integrated subsystems.
IX. PARTIAL REDUCTIONS AND ISOLATED
SUBSYSTEMS
Let us now examine the consequences of relaxing the
restriction to integrated subsystems imposed at the end
of Sec. IV F. The purpose of that restriction was to cir-
cumvent difficulties arising from widely divergent deco-
herence times τdec(k) for different subsystems k. If these
decoherence times differ greatly, it becomes necessary to
consider reductions involving only a few subsystems at a
time, rather than the reduction of all subsystems at once.
Subsystems to be reduced are placed in a set A, while all
other subsystems belong to the complementary set B.
A. Partial reductions
A partial reduction of the subsystems in set A can be
generated by choosing all projectors (9) in the set (8)
such that for all k ∈ B, the set {P˜kik} contains only the
single element 1k. Such projectors then take the form
Pi =
∏
k
Pkik =
∏
k∈A
Pkik = P
A
i ⊗ 1B , (40)
in which PAi acts only in A. The decoherence time (15)
is likewise replaced with that of set A:
τdec(A) = max
k∈A
τdec(k). (41)
Note, however, that simply using the projector (40) in the
theory of Sec. VII does not yield the desired results, be-
cause this would generate a complete reduction in which
the subsystem states k ∈ B are all reduced to 1k. A sep-
arate theory of partial reductions is therefore necessary.
The root of the problem can be seen by noting what
would happen if we simply use the set (8) in the equiva-
lence class (24). All members of a given equivalence class
[ρ] would then have identical probabilities (5). However,
this criterion alone is insufficient to define the concept of
a partial reduction, because it does not impose any con-
straint on the subsystems in B. A partial reduction that
is applied only to the subsystems in A should minimize
changes in the subsystems in B. This can be achieved by
imposing a stronger constraint in which membership in
[ρ] is defined also by the values of the operators trA(ρPi).
Here trA σ denotes a partial trace of σ over the subsys-
tems in A, the result of which is an operator in B.
B. Equivalence class and reduction process
With this in mind, the equivalence class of ρ for a
partial reduction generated by the set (8) can be defined
as [cf. Eq. (24)]
[ρ] = {σ : trA(σPi) = trA(ρPi) ∀Pi ∈ P}. (42)
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As before, the quantum state is identified with [ρ]. The
associated reduced state (26) can then be correspond-
ingly redefined as
ρˆ =
∑
i
wiρi, ρi = ρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi , (43a)
ρAi =
PAi
dAi
, ρBi =
trA(Piρ)
wi
(wi 6= 0), (43b)
in which dAi = trP
A
i . Here ρ
A
i and ρ
B
i are normalized
density operators belonging to A and B, respectively.
The former represents a direct reduction of the A compo-
nent of ρ [cf. Eq. (34)], whereas the latter represents an
indirect reduction of the B component of ρ. This indirect
reduction is a consequence of the correlations between A
and B generated by their interactions.
The concept of indirect reduction of a microscopic sub-
system by a macroscopic apparatus was elucidated by
Landau and Lifshitz [137]. Their reduction process is for-
mulated in terms of the relative-state expansion for pure
states popularized by Everett [85, 86]. The expression
for ρˆ in Eq. (43) is similar but not identical to a relative-
state expansion. The density operator ρBi is called the
conditional state of B given the state ρAi of A [138]. Such
conditional states play an important role in the definition
of quantum discord [39–42].
As shown in Appendixes B and C, the definition (43)
of ρˆ shares many of the properties of the reduced state
(26) described in Sec. VII B. The most important of these
are Eqs. (25), (27), and (28), which establish that [ρ] can
be represented mathematically by ρˆ.
One may wonder whether the definition (42) contra-
dicts the justification given for the introduction of equiv-
alence classes in Sec. VII B, because membership in [ρ]
is no longer defined exclusively by empirically meaning-
ful probabilities [139]. However, the theory of Sec. VII
is not (and cannot be) formulated entirely in terms of
such probabilities, because the state ρ is required to fol-
low unitary dynamics (1) during the intervals between
reductions. The additional constraints on equivalence-
class membership imposed in Eq. (42) merely require the
B component of ρ to adhere as closely as possible to this
unitary dynamics—complete adherence being impossible
due to the effect of indirect reduction.
Given that [ρ] is no longer defined solely by probabili-
ties, no simple expression of the type shown in Eq. (36)
can be given for the distance between equivalence classes.
However, this distance can still be defined as the trace
distance between the class representatives [cf. Eq. (37)]:
∆([ρ], [ρ′]) = D(ρˆ, ρˆ′). (44)
The vanishing of the distance between [ρ] and [ρˆ] shown
in Eq. (38) remains valid, of course, because [ρˆ] = [ρ].
All of the qualitative conclusions in Sec. VII regarding
the emergence of outcomes can therefore be carried over
to the case of partial reductions.
C. Isolated subsystems
An isolated subsystem (cf. Sec. IV F) may be defined
as one that effectively never decoheres:
τdec(k)→∞. (45)
Such subsystems are permanently excluded from A.
Their states are therefore reduced only indirectly [137],
most commonly during measurement situations in which
the state of the subsystem becomes strongly correlated
with the state of a macroscopic measuring apparatus.
The recognition that an indirect reduction is as good
as a direct reduction [102, 140] played a significant role
in the history of quantum mechanics, leading Bohr to
abandon the local “disturbance” concept previously as-
sociated with measurement [106]. This was also the mo-
tivation for the use of the conditional states ρBi in the
definition of quantum discord [39–42].
The apparatus can perform a measurement only if it is
an integrated subsystem [72, 73, 124, 141], because this is
what allows it to undergo the decoherence necessary for
the emergence of definite outcomes [69]. This point was
stressed by Heisenberg [142]: “The measuring device de-
serves this name only if it is in close contact with the rest
of the world, if there is an interaction between the device
and the observer. . . . If the measuring device would be
isolated from the rest of the world, it would be neither a
measuring device nor could it be described in the terms
of classical physics at all.”
Although the direct reduction of isolated subsystems
is not part of the basic formalism of the present theory,
such reduction processes can sometimes be inserted “by
hand” into a history without generating any interference
problems. However, these optional insertions can often
be done in different ways that are mutually inconsistent
or complementary (i.e., the additional reductions are con-
sistent with noninterference individually but not jointly).
This possibility has led to much debate over the meaning
of the histories formalism [14, 65–67, 79, 143–148]. In re-
sponse, Omne`s [65, 66] introduced a distinction between
“true” events (which in the present context are those
arising from direct reduction of an integrated subsys-
tem, including the consequent indirect reduction of iso-
lated subsystems) and “reliable” or “trustworthy” events
(those arising from direct reduction of an isolated subsys-
tem). The latter have an inferior status because they are
subjective—they do not generate interference, but they
are essentially controlled by the whims of the theorist.
This may be taken as justification for the Copenhagen
practice of ascribing meaning to the properties of isolated
subsystems only in the context of their interactions with
a measuring apparatus. In what follows, it is assumed
that isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly.
Of course, even Landau and Lifshitz found it conve-
nient to introduce a linear operator in B (generally not a
projection operator) to describe the effect of indirect re-
duction on isolated subsystems [137]. In the present case,
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such a description could be implemented using the quan-
tum operations formalism discussed in Sec. IV I. How-
ever, this is only an alternative mathematical way of ex-
pressing the same physics of information acquisition. At
the fundamental level, the reduction of isolated subsys-
tems remains an indirect process.
D. Partially isolated subsystems
Thus far we have considered explicitly only integrated
subsystems, which are directly reduced at every reduc-
tion time tj , and isolated subsystems, which are never
directly reduced. Of course, the theory in Sec. IX B can
also be applied to partially isolated subsystems, which
are directly reduced occasionally but not always. How-
ever, this case brings in no qualitatively new features, so
it is not discussed further here.
E. Quantum-state tomography
In Sec. VII A, it was noted that the usual textbook de-
scription of quantum-state tomography [5, 103], in which
the density operator ρ is determined by “measuring” the
value of tr(Pρ) for a complete set of projectors P , is not
applicable to the case of a closed system, nor can it be
used to find the density operator of an open integrated
subsystem. The reason for this is that the only projectors
that can be “measured” in such cases are those belong-
ing to the orthogonal set that defines the reduction that
actually occurs at a given time. Such an orthogonal set
is never complete in the relevant sense, because it de-
fines only an equivalence class of density operators, not
a unique density operator.
The definition of a unique density operator by means
of quantum-state tomography can, however, be achieved
for an assembly of open isolated subsystems through the
use of indirect reductions. The state is first prepared
by performing an indirect reduction generated by some
given measuring apparatus. An assembly of identically
prepared subsystems is then allowed to interact with var-
ious other types of apparatus. If the indirect reductions
generated by these apparatuses can be formally described
as equivalent to direct reductions that form a complete
set of operators, the density operator of the isolated sub-
system is thereby defined uniquely.
Note that the assembly considered here is not an en-
semble in the sense defined in Sec. VIII. An assembly
of identically prepared isolated subsystems interacting
with identical apparatuses forms an ensemble, because
its statistical frequencies can be meaningfully compared
with theoretical probabilities. However, no such direct
comparison is possible for an assembly of isolated sub-
systems interacting with different apparatuses. Such an
assembly is, rather, a collection of different (in general
complementary) statistical ensembles.
F. Consistency of secondary measurements
d’Espagnat [149] has criticized Jauch’s [37] use of
equivalence classes to describe an isolated subsystem in-
teracting with a measuring apparatus on the grounds
that secondary measurements performed by another ap-
paratus for the purpose of distinguishing between the
members of such an equivalence class are difficult but not
fundamentally impossible. According to this argument,
one cannot say that the description of experimental out-
comes as equivalence classes is objective even in a weak
sense, because an inconsistency in the theoretical descrip-
tion could be demonstrated if a secondary measurement
of this type is performed. Bub [122] has also criticized the
theory of Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi [112] on similar
grounds.
A rejoinder to such anticipated criticism was given al-
ready by Jauch [37] on the basis of Bohr’s oft-repeated
statement that the very possibility of measurement im-
plies a classical apparatus. Although there is a kernel of
truth in this statement, such a terse reply is less than
fully satisfying. Here this question is examined from the
perspective of decoherence theory, which provides a more
complete answer.
The basic issue is that in order to demonstrate that
the isolated subsystem and primary apparatus are in an
entangled state rather than a statistical mixture, it is nec-
essary to isolate this composite system so that it does not
become entangled with its environment. Assuming that
this can be done, the composite system does not deco-
here; it therefore plays the same role as the isolated sub-
system in Sec. IX C. That is, it is reduced only indirectly,
as a consequence of its interaction with the secondary ap-
paratus. But the isolation of the primary apparatus from
the outside world means that it no longer functions as a
measuring device [72, 73, 124, 141] (see the quotation
from Heisenberg in Sec. IX C). The secondary apparatus
is, of course, presumed to be integrated, so that it can
decohere and perform its function as a measuring device.
Therefore, the relevant point is not that measuring
non-collective variables of a measuring apparatus is diffi-
cult, but rather that doing so requires an entirely differ-
ent experimental arrangement. Even if future advances
in technology allow such demanding experiments to be
performed, this would have no bearing on the question
of whether the original experiment was consistently de-
scribed. The decisive concept is once again that “unper-
formed experiments have no results” [106, 107].
G. Classical and quantum measurements
The basic issue can be restated concisely using the con-
cepts of classical and quantum measurements. A classical
measurement is what we infer from the correlations be-
tween the states of two integrated subsystems. A quan-
tum measurement is what we infer from the correlations
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between the states of an isolated subsystem and an inte-
grated subsystem.
Any number of classical measurements can be concate-
nated without changing the experimental arrangement.
But a quantum measurement of a quantum measurement
is a contradiction in terms, because a measuring appa-
ratus cannot be isolated by definition. Attempting to
isolate a quantum measuring apparatus so that it can
be subjected to a quantum measurement changes the
entire experimental arrangement. The modified exper-
imental arrangement is therefore irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether the original experiment was consistently
described.
X. THE PREFERRED-BASIS PROBLEM
The preferred-basis problem was set aside at the end of
Sec. VI F in order to focus on the problem of outcomes.
Let us now reexamine the former problem in the light of
what has been learned since then. The goal is to find a
way of dealing with the preferred-basis problem that is
consistent with the concept of dynamical stability intro-
duced in Sec. VI F.
A. The predictability sieve
Zurek has developed a variational method for this pur-
pose known as the “predictability sieve” [32, 58, 150,
151], in which projectors at an initial time ta are chosen
so as to yield the most predictable results (in a sense to
be described below) at some later time tb = ta+∆t. This
section describes a modified version of the predictability
sieve that is better suited for use with the reduction pro-
cess defined by Eqs. (4) and (43). Note that the times
ta and tb used here are different from those in Secs. VI D
and VI F [152].
The basic idea of the modified predictability sieve is
quite simple. Let ρ(ta) be the density operator at time ta.
At this time, we can use some given set of projectors (8)
to define the reduced states ρi(ta) in Eq. (43). Let these
states evolve unitarily until the final time tb, yielding
ρi(tb) = U(tb, ta)ρi(ta)U(ta, tb). (46)
At this time, the first stage (4a) of a second reduction is
performed using the same projector set P, yielding the
reduced states ρˆi(tb).
The modified predictability sieve requires us to choose
P so as to minimize the functional
G =
∑
i
wi(ta){S[ρˆi(tb)]− S[ρi(ta)]}, (47a)
the value of which is the mean entropy generated after
the first reduction. This is the same as the mean entropy
generated by the second reduction:
G =
∑
i
wi(ta){S[ρˆi(tb)]− S[ρi(tb)]}, (47b)
because the unitary evolution (46) does not change the
entropy. This functional therefore satisfies G ≥ 0, due to
the inequality (30).
Note that the entropy generated within each manifold
MAi (defined by the projector PAi ) has already been max-
imized as a consequence of the definition of the reduced
state (43). Since a change of states within MAi is re-
garded as an irrelevant change of internal variables, the
minimization of G can be viewed as a minimization of the
remaining macroscopic entropy generated by any changes
in the collective variables.
Why is this called a predictability sieve? Minimization
of the entropy-generation functional (47) means that the
nonvanishing conditional probabilities for the second re-
duction are concentrated on the smallest possible number
of manifolds MAj ; the evolution of the states ρi(t) after
the first reduction is therefore as close to deterministic
as possible.
This has the side effect of maximizing correlations
between subsystems, because uncorrelated subsystems
would have probabilities spread over more manifolds
MAj . The predictability sieve therefore tends to gener-
ate a redundancy of records in different subsystems, such
that knowledge of the collective variables in one subsys-
tem provides information about the collective variables
in other subsystems. The idea that a form of weak ob-
jectivity emerges from the proliferation of such records is
known as quantum Darwinism [59, 153–158].
The predictability sieve consequently maximizes pre-
dictability in two distinct ways. Not only does it select
reduced states whose behavior is as close to deterministic
as possible; it also allows the properties of subsystems to
be inferred from information about other subsystems.
This version of the predictability sieve uses the
same general entropy-minimization concept proposed in
Zurek’s original work [32, 58, 150, 151]. It differs, how-
ever, in the details of how the entropy is defined. The
original sieve dealt with individual pure states of a given
subsystem and generated entropy by taking a partial
trace over the environment of that subsystem. In con-
trast, the functional (47) is formulated directly in terms
of the entropy generated by the reduction process defined
by Eqs. (4) and (43). It therefore deals with all subsys-
tems together and with the entire set of projectors (8) as
a whole.
The main conceptual difference lies in the choice of
what is defined to be irrelevant in order to generate en-
tropy. One irrelevant quantity here is the distinction be-
tween different states in a manifold MAi . As described
in Sec. IV E, this concept of irrelevance cannot always be
handled by decomposing subsystems into a tensor prod-
uct of a collective subsystem and an internal environ-
ment. The recipe of tracing over an internal environment
is therefore generally incapable of handling the relevance
concept associated with collective variables.
Tracing over an environment also does not mean that
the environment is treated as irrelevant, at least in the
context of Zurek’s formulation of the predictability sieve.
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For example, if the total system is in a pure state, the
entropy of any subsystem is the same as the entropy of its
environment [1, 77], so minimizing the former is the same
as minimizing the latter. In any event, treating an ex-
ternal environment as truly irrelevant would be inappro-
priate even in cosmological contexts, because the state
of an entirely unknown environment should for consis-
tency be described as a state of maximum entropy. But
this corresponds to an infinite-temperature environment,
which conflicts with the experimental evidence showing
that our cosmological environment is better described as
a heat bath at a temperature of about 2.7 K.
Despite the difference in detail between the definitions
of the two sieves, the main qualitative conclusions derived
by applying Zurek’s original sieve to simple model sys-
tems are likely to hold for the modified sieve as well. In
particular, note that neither version of the predictabil-
ity sieve makes any reference to a criterion of macro-
scopic locality in coordinate space (cf. Sec. VI D). The de-
coherence of macroscopically nonlocal superpositions is,
rather, presumably a contingent dynamical consequence
of the predictability sieve for many typical initial states
ρ(ta) and Hamiltonians H and does not need to be im-
posed as an axiom. No explicit tests of this statement
are performed here, however.
B. Constrained variation and dynamical stability
In the above definition of the predictability sieve, the
projector set P was assumed not to change during the
time interval ∆t. This does not mean that P is indepen-
dent of time, because the application of the sieve at a
succession of different times ta will give a succession of
different values of P. What it does mean is that this pre-
dictability sieve is applicable only to projector sets that
are slowly varying functions of time. That is, it must be
possible to choose the interval ∆t between reductions to
satisfy Eq. (22), in which τP is the timescale for the dy-
namics of P. But this is just the condition for dynamical
stability introduced in Sec. VI F.
The constraint P(tb) = P(ta) could presumably be re-
laxed by allowing P(tb) to vary independently of P(ta)
and searching for minima of G in the neighborhood of
those derived from this constraint. However, the assump-
tion that P(tb) ≈ P(ta) could not be eliminated without
violating the criterion of dynamical stability.
C. Variation of subsystem decomposition
Note that the projector set P depends on the set of
variables S used to define the subsystem decomposition:
P = P(S). The variation of P in the search for minima
of G therefore generally involves variation of S as well.
In this way, the predictability sieve provides a criterion
for defining the time dependence of subsystem decompo-
sitions, at least in regard to macroscopic subsystems.
The variations of S and P may in general have to be
performed separately. For example, in typical quantum
measurement situations, an isolated subsystem interacts
with a macroscopic measuring apparatus that is initially
in a metastable state. During this interaction there is
a significant probability of triggering a phase transition,
such as the condensation of a liquid droplet in a cloud
chamber. For most practical experiments, the descrip-
tion of such amplification processes involving metastable
states would require the use of thermodynamic variables
such as temperature. This introduces an additional layer
of complication into the theory, because the subsystems
would then have to be defined at the thermodynamic
level, as discussed in Sec. II. That is, thermodynamic con-
cepts would emerge as usual from a conceptual statisti-
cal ensemble of quantum states in, say, a quasi-canonical
distribution. For the individual members of the ensem-
ble, the subsystem decompositions S would be treated as
fixed, and the predictability sieve would be applied only
to the projector sets P. Variation of S would be per-
formed in a separate predictability sieve applied to the
ensemble as a whole. However, to avoid inessential com-
plications, this thermodynamic type of description is not
considered further here.
D. Restriction of freedom to choose subsystems
The predictability sieve imposes a very powerful re-
striction on the freedom to choose the subsystems S and
projector sets P. Choices that violate these restrictions
are not logically forbidden, but they are basically use-
less for any type of practical calculations or meaningful
comparison with experiment. As noted by Bohr [106], a
limited degree of freedom remains, due in this case to the
presumed existence of multiple (possibly infinitely many)
viable solutions of the variation problem. However, this
restricted set of choices is, by any reasonable criterion, of
measure zero in comparison to the completely arbitrary
set that describes the possibilities prior to the solution of
the preferred-basis problem. The remaining freedom of
choice has no observable consequences as long as the pro-
jectors Pi and the reduction intervals ∆t are fine-grained
enough to be well below the resolution limit of any pro-
toscientists using the theory. In this way, the seemingly
arbitrary choice of S and P becomes weakly objective
rather than subjective.
E. Choice of microscopic observables
At this point we are in a position to address the ques-
tion raised at the end of Sec. VII E. Namely, is it not a
trivialization of the measurement problem if we only deal
with orthogonal sets of projectors at any given instant of
time? The questions that troubled the founders were
related, rather, to the freedom of the experimenter to
choose any observable from a noncommuting set. Indeed,
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the presumption that the experimenter has the freedom
to control the conditions of an experiment is a necessary
prerequisite for any pragmatic account of experimental
physics [76, 106, 124–126].
This freedom has already implicitly been incorporated
into the definition of the assembly of isolated subsystems
used to perform quantum-state tomography in Sec. IX E.
The basic issue is that the choice of observable is de-
termined by the choice of measuring apparatus used to
achieve the indirect reduction of the state of the isolated
subsystem. However, as shown above, the emergence of
outcomes occurs on the timescale ∆t  τP defined in
Eq. (22). But questions about the free will of the exper-
imenter become meaningful only in the opposite limit of
time intervals comparable to or greater than τP , where
other levels of emergence come into play.
The future dynamics of planets in the solar system
can be predicted with near certainty even for time in-
tervals much greater than τP . However, the future of
individual human beings (and their proxies, such as the
pseudo-random switches in the Aspect experiment [159])
is predictable only for time intervals close to τP , beyond
which the dynamics quickly becomes almost entirely un-
predictable. On these longer timescales, one can there-
fore invoke the free will of the experimenter without fear
of contradiction, even though this concept is nowhere to
be found among the basic principles of quantum mechan-
ics. It should be stressed that this level of emergence
does not require the formulation of any model for the
consciousness of the experimenter; it depends only on
the assumption that the choices of the experimenter are
wholly unpredictable and can thus be treated as “free”
variables within the theory [76, 125].
To put this in concrete terms, if an experimenter has
set up a given experiment, has placed her finger on the
“start” button, and the nerve impulses to press the but-
ton are already racing down her arm, she certainly does
not have the freedom to swap this experiment for an-
other. That freedom comes into being only on longer
timescales τfw  τP , when her actions are no longer pre-
dictable.
F. Redundancy of records as a primary concept
Riedel has recently suggested that the redundancy of
records described in Sec. X A can be used as a criterion
for the definition of branches of the quantum state vector
[160]. This definition also makes use of the condition
of locality in coordinate space discussed in Sec. VI D,
together with an explicit length scale defining the spatial
extent of nonlocality. It is not yet clear whether this
length scale can be eliminated from the definition [160],
but the concept of locality in coordinate space appears
to be fundamental to Riedel’s method.
It is also unclear whether the redundancy of records
can be developed into a practical tool for the construc-
tion of branches that has all of the advantages of the
predictability sieve. Here the latter has been chosen be-
cause it is more fully developed and the redundancy of
records can be derived from it without the need for any
a priori reference to locality in coordinate space.
One intriguing outcome of Riedel’s work is a definition
of compatibility of recorded observables that does not
require the corresponding operators to commute [160]. It
would be interesting to see whether this concept can be
developed further in a context free of locality constraints.
XI. EMERGENCE OF WEAK OBJECTIVITY
A. Weak objectivity in quantum mechanics
As noted already in Sec. IV G, the GMH demon is
just a useful idealization. All information gathered from
experiments is gathered by individual protoscientists; it
is therefore unavoidably subjective. The subjective ori-
gin of all quantum-mechanical information was acknowl-
edged early on by von Neumann [1], London and Bauer
[140], and Wigner [161], and this aspect of the problem is
embraced unflinchingly in the modern theory of quantum
Bayesianism (or QBism) [162–167].
However, to avoid accusations of blatant subjectivity
[112] or solipsism [168], it is helpful to formulate the
theory in a way that does not refer directly, at least in
the first instance, to the limitations of humans or other
individual observers. This is the role of the GMH de-
mon, for whom the relevant histories belong to a set
roughly comparable to what Gell-Mann and Hartle have
called a “maximal” [54, 83] or “full” [80, 169] set, thereby
defining a so-called quasiclassical realm [170, 171]. The
word “maximal” suggests that this set should be as fine-
grained as possible, consistent with the limitations of de-
coherence and predictability in Eq. (22). It is unlikely
that exact solutions can be found for this variation prob-
lem, but for practical purposes all that is needed is a
set of histories that is much more fine-grained than the
resolution limits of any protoscientist using the theory.
The histories relevant to these protoscientists can then be
taken to be coarse-grainings of the quasi-maximal set de-
fined for the GMH demon. Weak objectivity emerges in
the limit in which the fine-grained features of the demon’s
quasiclassical realm become indiscernible to all protosci-
entists using the theory.
Of course, from this point of view, there is no guarantee
that the quasiclassical realm corresponding to our every-
day experiences is unique [170, 172]. However, since the
existence of multiple inequivalent quasiclassical realms
would not affect the conclusion of weak objectivity, this
topic is not pursued further here.
B. Strong objectivity?
Many authors have tried to reformulate quantum me-
chanics as a strongly objective theory. The temptation
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to reach for this prize is obvious, but it comes at a price:
one must forfeit any possible claims of weak objectivity,
as these are derived from emergence. If the attempt at
strong objectivity fails, the theory that remains is merely
subjective.
In this genre, the class of theories known as dynamical-
reduction models [47, 48] is particularly well developed.
In the version known as continuous spontaneous local-
ization, reduction is generated by coarse-grained number
operators rather than projection operators. The most
important difference from the present theory, however, is
that the reduction process is tethered to a fixed choice
of preferred basis—namely, a coarse-grained coordinate
basis. The parameters of the model seem to be tailored
to mimic the emergence, in many common cases of deco-
herence, of such a basis as the preferred basis [30]. But
in decoherence theory, the preferred basis is always con-
tingent upon the form of the Hamiltonian and the initial
state ρ. As noted by Gell-Mann and Hartle [54], “there
are no variables that are expected to decohere univer-
sally.”
This leads to a well-known difficulty, in that decoher-
ence can occur by mechanisms that do not generate a
macroscopic displacement of particles in coordinate space
and thus do not immediately trigger a reduction in the
dynamical-reduction model [173]. In responding to this
criticism, Ghirardi et al. have argued that ultimately,
the detection of any measurement outcome in the eyes
and nervous system of a human observer would definitely
trigger such a reduction [47, 174, 175]. They have also
pointed out that such a process does not imply any role
for the consciousness of a sentient observer.
Nevertheless, the mere presence of such discrepancies
shows that a coarse-grained coordinate basis cannot serve
as the foundation for a weakly objective theory. They
also raise the suspicion that such a basis would be an in-
adequate foundation for a strongly objective theory too.
Ultimately the latter question can only be decided by
experiment. Dynamical-reduction models have recently
been subjected to increasingly stringent empirical tests,
which so far have not yielded any qualitative conclusions
[48, 176–182].
The fundamental issue of concern here is closely re-
lated to the questions about the concept of macroscopi-
cally local observables discussed in Secs. VI D and VI E.
However, there the criterion of macroscopic locality was
used only in the formulation of the pseudometric (17),
rather than being inserted directly into the definition of
a preferred basis.
Similar comments can be made about pilot-wave theo-
ries [44–46]. Here the ontology is based on particle trajec-
tories, even though the concept of a particle is known to
be emergent [183, 184] and individual trajectories cannot
be measured [185, 186], at least in the standard version
of the theory where particle probabilities are assumed to
follow the Born rule exactly [187]. Within this version
of the theory, there are infinitely many inequivalent ways
of defining the trajectories, all of which yield the same
experimental predictions [188]. All empirical predictions
are derived from the wave function itself and its decom-
position into subsystems [189]; the role of the particle
trajectories is simply to delineate a sequence of effective
reductions in the coordinate representation. At this level,
the particle trajectories are a purely subjective addition
to the formalism of orthodox quantum mechanics.
The only possible foundation for a claim of strong ob-
jectivity therefore lies in the “quantum non-equilibrium”
version of the theory in which the particle trajectories do
not satisfy the Born rule exactly [187]. Again, claims of
this sort can only be adjudicated experimentally. How-
ever, given that both the concept of a particle and the
special status of the coordinate representation emerge
from standard quantum mechanics, it is difficult to ac-
cept such a proposal of strong objectivity in the absence
of compelling evidence.
XII. EMERGENT REALITY
The theory developed here shows that the reduction
process can be regarded as emerging from unitary dy-
namics under certain well-defined conditions. However,
this situation is unusual in science because the base-level
theory (i.e., the Schro¨dinger equation for a closed system)
is not experimentally accessible [105, 190, 191]. Only the
overall theory comprising both reduction and unitary dy-
namics can be tested in the laboratory. What does it even
mean to talk of “emergence” in this case?
It is also common to think of the base level as be-
ing more “real” than the emergent level. The latter is
sometimes called an “illusion.” However, the word “real”
is also usually restricted to what is empirically testable.
How are we to deal with this situation?
The word “reality” has many different meanings. In
one sense it refers to something assumed to exist “out
there,” independent of any observer. But since we have
no access to any such “thing in itself,” this concept is not
very useful on its own. It is more useful to talk about
reality as an idea that we use to order and make sense
of our experience [192]. That is, we apply the concept of
reality to theories rather than things.
One such idea is that of an absolute or totalitarian
reality R, which is a Boolean variable. A value R ∈ {0, 1}
can always be assigned to any given theory. However, this
assignment must then be tested by comparing it with the
empirical or pragmatic reality r, which is a real variable
in the range 0 < r < 1 (not 0 ≤ r ≤ 1). It may be defined
as
r = exp(−η), η = max
x∈D
|∆x|
δx
, (48)
in which x is some set of variables, ∆x is the discrepancy
between theory and experiment, and δx is a typical range
of x in some domain of experience D. If η  1, we can
say that the theory is real in the pragmatic sense within
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this given domain. But such a result can never strictly
justify an assignment of R = 1 in the absolute sense.
A major difficulty with the concept of absolute reality
is that any assignment of R = 1 immediately becomes
invalid whenever the theory is found to emerge from an-
other level. But this means that R is a chimera, because
(as noted in the Introduction) there are no empirically
validated theories (i.e., theories with η  1 in some do-
main) that are not already known to be emergent. The
only “laws” of physics thus far discovered are approxi-
mate ways of describing some part of our experience, not
clockwork mechanisms that control the universe.
Hence, all we have left is the domain-dependent con-
cept of pragmatic reality. This has the advantage that
the concept of reality now becomes meaningful in many
different domains; we no longer have to assume that ev-
erything we see is an illusion. But we also no longer have
the right to assign an absolute reality to anything.
In this sense it is not meaningful to talk about the
reality of the unitarily evolving quantum state, prior to
any concept of reduction. Pragmatic reality deals only
with the experimentally accessible combination of uni-
tary evolution and reduction. But the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion still plays an indispensable role in this combination.
As Feynman has observed [193], “it is not true that we
can pursue science completely by using only those con-
cepts which are directly subject to experiment.” It is
hard to imagine how a useful theory of open-system dy-
namics could be formulated without making use at some
point of assumptions about the environment of the open
system, developed in the context of a larger system evolv-
ing according to the Schro¨dinger equation. And it is well
known that reducing the state prematurely will give re-
sults in conflict with experiment [121].
In recognition of this role, the unreduced quantum
state is sometimes said to represent a kind of “veiled real-
ity” [14]. Weinberg expressed this idea clearly [194] when
he said that “wave functions are real for the same reason
that quarks and symmetries are—because it is useful to
include them in our theories.”
The quark is an apt analogy because the theory of
quantum chromodynamics itself predicts that free quarks
can never be observed experimentally. Yet the concept
of a quark is now accepted as a part of reality because
it is so useful as an organizing principle for experiments
in high-energy physics—in particular, those performed in
the domain of asymptotic freedom.
Likewise, Everett himself showed no compunction in
acknowledging that [105] “it is impossible for any ob-
server to discover the total state function of any physical
system.” Yet the total state of a closed system, indepen-
dent of any reduction, is useful enough to be recognized
as a part of reality, particularly in light of quantum-state
tomography experiments used to measure (in the sta-
tistical sense) the states of isolated subsystems—a type
of asymptotic freedom, as it were. Of course, emergent
subsystems and the reduction process are parts of this
reality, too.
In a similar manner, it is meaningful to talk about
the emergence of reduction from unitary evolution sim-
ply because this concept is useful. Formulating the mea-
surement problem in terms of emergence is beneficial be-
cause it places both the objective and subjective aspects
of quantum mechanics front and center and forces us to
reconcile them. If nothing else, this approach may help
to short-circuit the heated debates over philosophical is-
sues that tend to be generated when objectivity is viewed
as a binary concept, with nothing between the two poles
of strong objectivity and pure subjectivity.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
Many authors have argued that the key to the mea-
surement problem lies in the macroscopic nature of the
measuring apparatus and the corresponding inability of
an observer to distinguish among the many microstates
consistent with a given macrostate of the apparatus
[91, 112, 195–197]. However, it has long been known that
this argument provides at best some partial support for
a statistical interpretation of the state vector; it does not
justify the claim that either the state vector or the den-
sity operator is consistent with the appearance of definite
experimental outcomes [2, 11, 13, 16, 17].
Here I have shown that the problem of outcomes can
be resolved, at least in the sense of emergence, if the
assertion of an observer’s inability to distinguish among
these microstates is followed through and applied consis-
tently in all parts of the theory. Consistency demands
that the quantum state be defined not as a vector, ray,
or density operator in Hilbert space but as an equiva-
lence class of density operators [36–38]. For integrated
subsystems, such an equivalence class can be represented
mathematically by a projection operator [36], but if iso-
lated subsystems are involved, the class representative
must also include the associated conditional states. This
definition must be applied every time the quantum state
is reduced, on a timescale slow in comparison to the de-
coherence time but fast in comparison to the relevant
quasiclassical dynamics. The ubiquitous Lu¨ders reduc-
tion formula [60] retains too much information. Trying
to justify the appearance of distinct outcomes using this
formula is like trying to justify the second law of ther-
modynamics without repeatedly discarding the irrelevant
information generated during the mixing process; it sim-
ply cannot be done.
The use of equivalence classes in the quantum theory
of measurement has been advocated by such luminaries
as von Neumann [36] and Jauch [37, 38]. To the extent
that their proposals are remembered today, they seem to
be regarded mainly as failed rivals to the throne currently
occupied by decoherence theory. However, as Zurek has
pointed out [158], a likely reason for the slow progress in
almost a century of work on the measurement problem is
that its solution requires many ideas, not just one. Here
the definition of quantum states as equivalence classes is
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indeed only one piece of the puzzle. Its utility is maxi-
mized by working in harmony with the other concepts of
decoherence theory, rather than as a competitor.
One of the most important of these concepts is that of
dynamical stability. This can be used to define a met-
ric in which the distance between states before and af-
ter reduction becomes arbitrarily small in the limit of
slowly varying projector sets, without referring to any
criterion of locality in coordinate space. This provides
additional support for the introduction of equivalence
classes in which these states are defined to be identical.
The concept of dynamical stability also appears in
the form of the predictability sieve used to solve the
preferred-basis problem. Here the predictability sieve has
been adapted to ensure its consistency with the modified
reduction process, but Zurek’s basic principle of entropy
minimization [150] remains the same. On the other hand,
entropy is also maximized, following Jaynes [114], with
respect to the states within a given manifold defined by
the collective variables. The basic idea is to minimize the
entropy of whatever we can, in principle, obtain infor-
mation about (i.e., the collective variables of integrated
subsystems) and maximize the entropy of everything else.
This entropy maximization is at first glance just a nat-
ural outcome of the definition of equivalence-class rep-
resentatives. However, at a deeper level it is seen to be
a fundamental postulate of dynamics, on par with the
Schro¨dinger equation itself.
Another essential concept is that isolated subsystems
are reduced only indirectly, via their interaction with the
directly reduced states of integrated subsystems. The
basis for this approach in standard quantum mechan-
ics is described clearly by Landau and Lifshitz [137]. In
the context of the present theory of equivalence classes,
this indirect reduction of isolated subsystems leads to
the conditional states now widely used in the definition
of quantum discord [39–42]. The distinct roles played
by isolated and integrated subsystems in this theory are
reminiscent of Bohr’s insistence on the “necessity of dis-
criminating in each experimental arrangement between
those parts of the physical system considered which are
to be treated as measuring instruments and those which
constitute the objects under investigation” [106]. Bohr’s
argument, like the one given here, concerns the way in
which information is extracted from these subsystems.
In the resulting theory, the pristine beauty of the
Schro¨dinger equation is “continually abrogated by dice-
miracles” [198]. Nevertheless, the existence of an emer-
gent limit ensures that the abrogation is smooth enough
to be unnoticeable on some measures, thereby allowing
a peaceful coexistence between the objective features de-
scribed by unitary dynamics and the subjective features
described by the reduction process. Because the simulta-
neous presence of these objective and subjective features
is mandated not just by quantum mechanics but by the
scientific method itself, it is unlikely that we can ever
“unscramble Bohr’s omelette” [199] in the sense of iso-
lating the objective features in an empirically validated
theory. Hence, we are stuck with a weakly objective the-
ory that is good only for all practical purposes [13]. But
that is good enough.
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Appendix A: Fidelity and trace distance for Lu¨ders
reduction of pure states
The trace distance (16) is bounded by the inequalities
[115]
1−
√
F (ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ), (A1)
in which the fidelity is defined as [77, 89]
F (ρ, σ) ≡
(
tr
√
ρ1/2σρ1/2
)2
= F (σ, ρ). (A2)
If ρ is a pure state, this takes the simple form [77]
F (ρ, σ) = tr ρσ, (A3)
and the bounds (A1) can be tightened to [77]
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ). (A4)
This is obtained by substituting P = ρ into the inequality
tr[P (ρ− σ)] ≤ D(ρ, σ) [cf. Eqs. (17) and (19)].
The example discussed in Sec. VI A is the case of a
Lu¨ders reduction for a pure state ρ. The relevant fideli-
ties are then
F (ρ, ρˆ) =
∑
i
w2i , (A5a)
F (ρ, ρi) = wi, (A5b)
in which all quantities are evaluated at some given reduc-
tion time t = tj . Clearly, neither of the corresponding
trace distances D is small for the general case in which
more than one value of wi is significant.
If, however, the outcome i = 1 is dominant, it is conve-
nient to write w1 = 1−, where  1. For arbitrary  we
have
∑
i 6=1 wi = , 0 ≤ wi 6=1 ≤ , and 0 ≤
∑
i6=1 w
2
i ≤ 2,
hence
F (ρ, ρˆ) = 1− 2+ α2 (1 ≤ α ≤ 2). (A6)
The relevant bounds (A4) on the trace distance are
2− 22 ≤ D(ρ, ρˆ) ≤
√
2− 2, (A7a)
 ≤ D(ρ, ρ1) ≤
√
, (A7b)
1−  ≤ D(ρ, ρi 6=1) ≤ 1. (A7c)
Thus, in the limit  → 0, we have D(ρ, ρˆ) → 0,
D(ρ, ρ1) → 0, and D(ρ, ρi6=1) → 1. As noted in Sec.
VI A, this leads to the emergence of quasiclassical deter-
minism.
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Appendix B: Isomorphism between equivalence
classes and reduced states
Here Eq. (27) is proved for the general partial reduc-
tion discussed in Sec. IX B. The changes involved in the
special case of a total reduction (discussed in Sec. VII B)
are indicated in the comments below Eq. (B2).
To prove Eq. (27), note that [ρ] = [σ] ⇔ [ρˆ] = [σˆ] is a
direct consequence of Eq. (25), whereas ρˆ = σˆ ⇒ [ρˆ] = [σˆ]
follows immediately from the definition of an equivalence
class. The only significant part of Eq. (27) is thus the
implication [ρˆ] = [σˆ]⇒ ρˆ = σˆ. Here [ρˆ] = [σˆ] means that
trA[(ρˆ− σˆ)Pi] = 0 ∀Pi ∈ P, (B1)
in which ρˆ and σˆ can be written as [cf. Eq. (43)]
ρˆ =
∑
j
PAj ⊗RBj , σˆ =
∑
j
PAj ⊗ SBj , (B2)
for some given sets of operators {RBj } and {SBj }. (For a
total reduction, the set A includes all subsystems, so the
tensor product with respect to RBj reduces to multiplica-
tion by a number Rj .) The quantity of interest is then
trA[(ρˆ− σˆ)Pi] =
∑
j
(RBj − SBj ) tr(PAj PAi ) (B3a)
=
∑
j
(RBj − SBj )δij trPAj (B3b)
= (RBi − SBi )dAi . (B3c)
Hence, from Eq. (B1) we have
[ρˆ] = [σˆ]⇒ RBi = SBi ∀i (B4a)
⇒ ρˆ = σˆ, (B4b)
which was to be proved.
Appendix C: Increase of entropy upon partial
reductions
The equivalence class (42) and reduced state (43) for
the partial reduction discussed in Sec. IX B share many of
the properties of the equivalence class (24) and reduced
state (26) for the total reduction discussed in Sec. VII B.
The most important of these properties are the identities
shown in Eqs. (25), (27), and (28).
The derivation of Eq. (25) is a simple exercise that
follows immediately from the orthogonality relations (3).
The derivation of Eq. (27) was given already in Appendix
B. The only remaining case is therefore Eq. (28).
As noted in Sec. VII B, Eq. (28) is a consequence of
Eqs. (27) and (30). The proof of Eq. (30) in the case of
a partial reduction follows that given by von Neumann
[36] for a total reduction. To set the stage, let us start
by considering the transformation
ρ′ = PAρPA, (C1)
in which PA is a projector that acts nontrivially only on
the subsystems in set A:
PA = P˜A ⊗ 1B . (C2)
The density operator ρ can be expanded as
ρ =
∑
i,j
cijAi ⊗Bj (cij ∈ C), (C3)
in which Ai and Bj are operators that act in A and B,
respectively. Thus
ρ′ =
∑
i,j
cij(P˜AAiP˜A)⊗Bj . (C4)
The projector P˜A can be expanded as
P˜A =
d∑
µ=1
|eµ〉〈eµ|, (C5)
in which {|eµ〉} is some orthonormal basis of eigenvectors
of P˜A. Equation (C4) then becomes
ρ′ =
d∑
µ,ν=1
MAµν ⊗ trA(ρM†µν), (C6)
in which
Mµν = M
A
µν ⊗ 1B , MAµν = |eµ〉〈eν |. (C7)
For the special case of a rank-one projector (i.e., d = 1),
we have M11 = PA and thus
ρ′ = P˜A ⊗ trA(ρPA). (C8)
This result can now be used to evaluate the successive
transformations
ρ′ =
∑
α
PAαρPAα =
∑
α
P˜Aα ⊗ trA(ρPAα) (C9)
and
ρ′′ =
∑
β
QAβρ
′QAβ =
∑
β
Q˜Aβ ⊗ trA(ρ′QAβ), (C10)
in which {PAα} and {QAβ} are sets of rank-one projec-
tors. Following von Neumann [36], we can choose these
projectors to form complementary sets in each subspace
defined by the projectors Pi. The derivation given by
von Neumann [36] then shows immediately that ρ′′ is the
same as the reduced state ρˆ defined in Eq. (43). But Eqs.
(C9) and (C10) are Lu¨ders reductions, which cannot de-
crease the entropy S(ρ) [77]. Hence, the nondecreasing-
entropy property (30) has been established, from which
the maximum-entropy property (28) follows.
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